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Article

The Geography of Equal Protection
Christopher R. Leslie

†

Equal protection doctrine should play a central role in the
evolution of gay rights jurisprudence. After all, gay Americans
simply want to be afforded legal rights equal to those of their
heterosexual family members, coworkers, and neighbors. Historically, however, most equal protection claims challenging anti-gay laws have failed. Most of these failures flowed from
courts’ refusal to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation discrimination. By evaluating anti-gay laws under the
more deferential rational basis standard, judges generally uphold laws with the purpose and effect of denying equality to
millions of Americans.
Many judges who refuse to treat sexual orientation as a
suspect classification justify their holdings by asserting that
gay men and lesbians are not politically powerless and, thus,
are not entitled to heightened scrutiny. It is puzzling that judges claim that gay men and lesbians have so much political power given that the federal government, dozens of state governments, and hundreds of local governments have enacted laws to
discriminate against gay people.
Several scholars have criticized courts for applying the political powerlessness factor of equal protection analysis inconsistently and without a proper measurement tool. This Article
adds another critique: courts generally fail to consider the geography of political power. Minorities can have political power
in some locations but not others. Judicial conclusions regarding
political power are based primarily on where judges look for evidence. This Article demonstrates how courts misapply the po-

† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of
Law. The author thanks Erwin Chemerinsky, Catherine Fisk, Doug NeJaime,
Tony Reese, and Bertrall Ross for comments on earlier drafts, and the participants in the UC Irvine School of Law workshop for early feedback on the project. Copyright © 2017 by Christopher R. Leslie.
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litical power component of equal protection analysis when determining whether a classification is suspect. This is most easily observed in the judicial treatment of sexual orientation.
Using the decades-old debate over whether laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation should be subject to
heightened scrutiny, this Article shows how courts generally
have mishandled the geographic dimension of the political
power inquiry. Using sexual orientation as a case study to explore the geography of political power is appropriate, given the
legal vulnerability of the millions of gay and lesbian Americans
1
targeted by anti-gay laws. For well over half a century, gay
Americans have existed as an “unrecognized minority” relegat2
ed to second-class citizenship—if recognized as citizens at all.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the basics of equal protection analysis. Courts are split on whether to apply heightened scrutiny or rational basis review to laws and policies that
discriminate based on sexual orientation. The level of scrutiny
applied in equal protection analysis is particularly important in
gay rights litigation. Courts tend to uphold anti-gay laws when
applying rational basis review, but almost always invalidate
anti-gay laws when heightened scrutiny is employed. Thus, because the level of scrutiny is often outcome determinative, the
probability of courts protecting gay Americans from discrimination is often a function of whether judges conclude that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification. To determine this, courts
generally consider four factors: whether the members of the
group: (1) have historically been subjected to discrimination; (2)
share a defining characteristic unrelated to their ability to perform or contribute to society; (3) share a defining immutable
characteristic; and (4) lack political power. Courts almost uniformly find that the first two factors describe gay people. While
courts have split on the third factor, the modern trend is to
1. See Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 33, 53 (2010) (“[W]hether to recognize sexual orientation as a
suspect classification is the critical issue for the Court’s suspect classification
jurisprudence.”).
2. DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 13 (1951) (“Thus the homosexuals constitute what can be
termed the unrecognized minority. We are a group by reason of the fact that
we have impulses in common that separate us from the larger mass of people
we are a minority, not only numerically, but also as a result of a caste-like status in society.”); see also In re Longstaff, 538 F. Supp. 589, 593 (N.D. Tex.
1982), aff ’d In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1451 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying citizenship to petitioner because of his homosexuality).
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treat sexual orientation as immutable. This makes the fourth
factor—political powerlessness—critical in determining whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification.
Part II focuses on the political power component of equal
protection analysis. The purpose of the political power factor is
to ensure legal protections for minorities who face discrimination because of a failed political process. Although many courts
have held this factor to be determinative in denying heightened
scrutiny of anti-gay laws, courts have not clearly defined political power for the purposes of suspect classifications. Part II reviews the well-recognized problems with the political power inquiry. First, and foremost, courts have not constructed an
actual measure of political power. Second, courts apply the political power factor inconsistently by treating gays as too politically powerful to warrant heightened scrutiny, while simultaneously granting heightened scrutiny to many groups—
including straight, white men—who have considerably more political power than gays. Ultimately, courts often apply the political power factor in a manner that is impossible to satisfy because judges ignore truly powerless groups.
Part III introduces a new critique of political power analysis in equal protection jurisprudence based on the geography of
political power. Gay Americans face discrimination from every
level of government. The federal government has long discriminated against gay people—from prohibiting their immigration
and governmental employment for most of the twentieth century to, more recently, forbidding the recognition of legal samesex marriages. In the absence of federal-level protections, gay
Americans are also subject to discriminatory laws imposed by
their state governments. Before 1960, all states criminalized
private sexual conduct between consenting adult same-sex couples through sodomy laws, laws that remained in place in a
dozen states until invalidated by the Supreme Court in Law3
rence v. Texas. Until 2003, all states banned same-sex marriage. Although the Supreme Court struck down sodomy laws
and same-sex marriage bans as violating the U.S. Constitu4
tion, many state governments continue to enact and enforce
explicitly anti-gay laws, including prohibiting gay individuals
and couples from adopting children, legally authorizing antigay discrimination by both government officials and private in-

3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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dividuals who operate public accommodations, and forbidding
cities from including sexual orientation in their local nondiscrimination ordinances. In contrast to these relatively gayhostile states, some states have enacted gay-protective laws,
such as including sexual orientation in non-discrimination laws
covering employment and public accommodations.
Part IV discusses how courts fail to appreciate these regional variations in political power when determining whether
gays have political power. In many cases, courts have relied
upon evidence of political power in geographic areas that are
irrelevant to the actual political process that produced the antigay law being challenged. For example, in equal protection
challenges to federal laws and policies—such as the military’s
prohibition on gay servicemembers—many courts have held
that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification because a
handful of states and several cities have adopted gay-inclusive
nondiscrimination laws. These courts have never explained
why these isolated non-federal victories are relevant to whether
gays have political power to affect federal anti-gay laws, such
as those being challenged in a particular case. Similarly, when
evaluating equal protection challenges to anti-gay state laws,
courts often find that gays have political power—and thus do
not qualify for heightened scrutiny—by pointing to gayprotective laws in other states. This makes little sense. The fact
that the California legislature does a relatively good job of protecting gay rights should not mean that anti-gay legislation in
Oklahoma gets substantial judicial deference. To do so would
essentially punish gay citizens in Oklahoma for the political
victories achieved by gay citizens in California. Part IV explains that courts make a fundamental error when they examine the wrong geographic area when discussing the political
power factor.
Finally, Part V considers the legal implications of these geographic issues for equal protection analysis. The most
straightforward solution to the problem of regional variations
in political power would be for courts to consider whether gay
people have meaningful political power with respect to the specific legislative body that enacted the anti-gay law that is being
challenged. While this could solve the problems highlighted in
Part IV, it would create larger problems of asymmetrical constitutional protections, as the same law could fail heightened
scrutiny in some states (where gays are determined to be politically powerless) and yet survive rational basis in other states
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(where gays are determined to be politically powerful). Part V
explains that given the regional variations of political power,
coupled with the need for uniform application of equal protection analysis across the nation, the most prudent approach is to
eliminate the political power inquiry altogether and instead rely on other factors that better indicate whether a challenged
law is likely a product of prejudice. The factors of historical discrimination and whether the members of the affected group
share a defining characteristic related to their ability to perform or contribute to society are better geared for this purpose.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
A. THE MECHANICS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection Clause protects members of disadvantaged groups from discriminatory laws and policies imposed
5
by political majorities. Scholars have advanced competing theories to explain the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. For
example, under anti-subordination theory, “the Equal Protection Clause should be understood to bar those government actions that have the intent or the effect of perpetuating tradi6
tional patterns of hierarchy.” In contrast, anti-classification
theory argues that “the government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden cate7
gory.”
Whatever the theoretical underpinnings, equal protection
8
analysis proceeds in three steps. In the first step, the judge determines whether the challenged law classifies people based on
a particular trait. In the second step, the court determines the
level of scrutiny associated with that classification. Finally, in
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161, 1174 (1988) (“The function of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect
disadvantaged groups . . . against the effects of past and present discrimination by political majorities.”).
6. Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Toward a ZeroSum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 206 (2010).
7. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10
(2003); see also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future
Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1064 n.16 (2011) (describing the two competing theories).
8. See, e.g., Kan. One-Call Sys., Inc. v. State, 274 P.3d 625, 635 (Kan.
2012) (listing the three steps in explaining equal protection analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution’s Bill of Rights).
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the third step, the court applies the appropriate level of scrutiny—arrived at in step two—and determines whether the challenged law violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Regarding the second step, the Supreme Court has delineated three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scru9
tiny, and rational basis review. These represent descending
levels of scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the government has
the burden of proving that the challenged law’s classifications
“are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling gov10
ernmental interests.” For over half a century, courts have applied strict scrutiny to government actions that infringe fundamental rights or discriminate based on race or national
11
origin. The test was sufficiently rigid that Gerald Gunther
once described the Warren Court’s approach as “‘strict’ in theo12
ry and fatal in fact,” a characterization from which the Burger
13
Court later distanced itself. In any case, laws that discriminate based on race are generally struck down as violating the
Equal Protection Clause.
Under intermediate scrutiny, “restrictions ‘will survive
equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially
14
related to a legitimate state interest.’” “Substantially related,”
in turn, requires that the proffered explanation be “exceedingly
persuasive,” and “not hypothesized or invented post hoc in re15
sponse to litigation.” Courts apply intermediate scrutiny to
government actions that discriminate based on gender and ille16
gitimacy. The application of heightened scrutiny to gender
discrimination in the 1970s was particularly significant, given
9. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215–21 (1982), superseded by statute,
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), Pub. L. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
This Article will refer to strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny collectively as “heightened scrutiny,” as distinguished from rational basis review.
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
11. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1078.
12. Id. at 1079 (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
13. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
14. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)
(quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)).
15. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
16. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426 (Conn. 2008).

2017]

GEOGRAPHY OF EQUAL PROTECTION

1585
17

the Court’s prior decisions to endorse such discrimination. As
Professor Bertrall Ross explains, “[T]he intermediate level of
scrutiny was a mechanism through which the Court could differentiate between laws based on ‘real’ gender differences and
18
those based on stereotypes.” This level of heightened scrutiny
has proven powerful in addressing the historic discrimination
19
faced by American women.
Under rational basis review, “a statutory classification
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur20
pose.” Non-suspect classifications are reviewed under this
21
standard, which is typically extremely deferential. The government “has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
22
rationality of a statutory classification.” The vast majority of
23
government actions survive this level of scrutiny.
In addition to federal equal protection claims, civil rights
lawyers can also pursue state equal protection claims. Many
state constitutions define equal protection guarantees more
24
broadly than the U.S. Constitution, which supplies a floor of
protection upon which state constitutions can provide greater

17. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (upholding Illinois prohibition against women practicing law), abrogated by Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
18. Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565,
1594–95 (2013) (citation omitted).
19. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (using heightened scrutiny to strike
down Virginia’s exclusion of women from citizen-soldier program offered at
Virginia Military Institute).
20. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citing San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
21. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
22. Id.
23. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1077–78 (“Not surprisingly,
few government actions have ever been found unconstitutional under this
test.”).
24. See, e.g., Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705, 723 (Conn. 2000)
(“[D]epending upon the facts and circumstances, the state constitution may
afford greater protection than the federal constitution with regard to equal
protection claims.” (citing Barton v. Ducci Elec. Contractors, Inc., 730 A.2d
1149 (Conn. 1999))); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948–
49 (Mass. 2003) (“The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution; it may
demand broader protection for fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of
government intrusion into the protected spheres of private life.”); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999) (“[T]he Common Benefits Clause of the
Vermont Constitution differs markedly from the federal Equal Protection
Clause in its language, historical origins, purpose, and development.”).
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25

protection. Similar to the federal approach, many state courts
apply one of three different levels of scrutiny, depending on the
26
characteristic upon which the challenged law discriminates.
In determining the proper level of scrutiny, state courts examine similar considerations to federal courts, including immuta27
bility and political power. However, because state courts are
often more protective in their applications of equal protection
doctrine, state courts may invalidate under the state constitution’s equal protection clause—or its equivalent—state laws
28
that would survive scrutiny under federal law. Gay rights advocates have used this fact to successfully challenge state laws
29
that discriminate based on sexual orientation. Nevertheless,
many state courts treat rational basis review as similarly def30
erential under state constitutional analysis. Thus, the level of
scrutiny remains important in state courts.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
The debate over the proper level of scrutiny is not merely
academic. Scholars have long noted that the level of scrutiny is

25. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 420 (Conn. 2008)
(“[F]ederal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national
standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.” (quoting
State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 590 (Conn. 1995))).
26. See, e.g., id. at 423 (“We therefore apply the same three-tiered equal
protection methodology that is applied under the federal equal protection
clause for purposes of our state constitution.”).
27. See, e.g., id. at 429 (“Nevertheless, because the court has identified the
immutability of the group’s distinguishing characteristic and the group’s minority status or relative lack of political power as potentially relevant factors
to the determination of whether heightened judicial protection is appropriate,
we, too, shall consider those factors for purposes of our inquiry under the state
constitution.”).
28. See, e.g., id. at 420 (“Therefore, although we may follow the analytical
approach taken by courts construing the federal constitution, our use of that
approach for purposes of the state constitution will not necessarily lead to the
same result as that arrived at under the federal constitution.” (citing State v.
Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 62–63 (Conn. 1990))).
29. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (holding
that the “Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution”).
30. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 604 (Md. 2007) (“A statute
subject to rational review often passes constitutional muster.” (citing Hargrove
v. Bd. of Tr. of Md. Ret. Sys., 529 A.2d 1372, 1383 (1987))), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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31

often dispositive in equal protection cases. This is particularly
true in gay rights litigation. Applying rational basis review,
federal courts have upheld state laws that criminalized private
32
homosexual conduct between consenting adults, state laws
33
that ban gays from adopting children, and the military’s anti34
gay policies for decades. Gay litigants generally lose under the
35
rational basis standard.
The major area where courts have used rational basis to
strike down anti-gay laws is atypical: same-sex marriage bans.
36
Prior to United States v. Windsor, which struck down DOMA,
most courts employed rational basis review to uphold both state
and federal laws that prohibited the legal recognition of samesex relationships, including marriage and rights associated
37
with marriage. Some state courts applied heightened scrutiny
31. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1076 (“First, the rigid
levels of scrutiny mean that unless alleged government discrimination receives heightened scrutiny the odds are overwhelming that the government
will prevail.”); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
32. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
827 (11th Cir. 2004).
34. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1996)
(same); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding
pre-DADT military policy to exclude gay servicemembers); see also High Tech
Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding discriminatory policy to deny security clearances to gay applicants
and employees).
35. One key exception is Romer v. Evans, in which the Supreme Court
struck down Colorado’s amendment 2—which precluded local governments
from prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation—under rational
basis review. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). Some commentators explained Romer as an example of so-called “rational basis with bite.”
While the prospect of applying rational basis with bite to anti-gay legislation
is promising, Romer has not prevented lower courts from upholding such legislation under rational basis review. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 761 (2011) (collecting examples); id. (“Rational
basis with bite review is not equivalent to formal heightened scrutiny.”).
36. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
37. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(upholding DOMA); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding New York same-sex marriage ban); Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y.,
802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (denying same-sex couple standing to bring wrongful death suits); Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d
121, 123–24 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (denying family health insurance for samesex partners).
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under their state versions of the Equal Protection Clause to
38
strike down their states’ bans on same-sex marriage. Before
Windsor, the level of scrutiny was largely outcome determina39
tive in same-sex marriage cases. In this era, some judges explicitly noted that discriminatory marriage laws that would be
invalidated under heightened scrutiny would survive rational
40
basis review. For example, when the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld that state’s same-sex marriage prohibition under
rational basis review, the court’s chief judge noted that the law
would not survive constitutional analysis if it were subjected to
41
heightened scrutiny.
The potency of rational basis review—as applied to samesex marriage bans—changed considerably following Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor. After Windsor made a
clear legal case for why state same-sex marriage bans were un38. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411–12 (Conn.
2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
Immediately prior to Windsor, some federal courts held DOMA to be unconstitutional under rational basis review. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (striking down
DOMA); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 342 (D. Conn.
2012) (same).
Some courts debate the question of the appropriate standard of review for
discrimination based on sexual orientation by concluding that the challenged
policy does not survive rational basis review and thus determining whether
sexual orientation is a suspect classification is unnecessary. The Massachusetts Supreme Court and the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts did so explicitly by concluding that the state’s ban on same-sex marriage failed the rational basis test. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp.
2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010) (“This court need not address these arguments,
however, because DOMA fails to pass constitutional muster even under the
highly deferential rational basis test.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“For the reasons we explain below, we conclude
that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection.”). But see id. at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (“Although ostensibly applying the rational basis test to the civil marriage statutes,
it is abundantly apparent that the court is in fact applying some undefined
stricter standard to assess the constitutionality of the marriage statutes’ exclusion of same-sex couples.”).
39. Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage
Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1086–87 (2014).
40. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 9–10.
41. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 697 (Md. 2007) (Bell, C.J., dissenting), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (“Under the highly deferential rational basis inquiry, encouraging procreation between opposite-sex
individuals within the framework of marriage is a legitimate government interest furthered by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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constitutional, federal and state courts invoked Windsor to invalidate discriminatory state marriage laws, using both ration42
43
al basis review and heightened scrutiny. While courts used
rational basis to strike down same-sex marriage bans, the situation is uncharacteristic because the Supreme Court had entered the fray. Rational basis was sufficient in these postWindsor marriage cases because the Supreme Court had clearly signaled the unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.
Absent such clear guidance from the Supreme Court, gay litigants do not fare so well.
The marriage cases aside, when courts apply rational basis
review, courts more often than not uphold laws that discrimi44
nate against gay Americans. In contrast, in cases in which the
court has applied heightened scrutiny, anti-gay laws have almost invariably been struck down as violating equal protec45
tion. Sexual orientation provides a natural experiment to witness the importance of the level of scrutiny because courts are
divided on whether or not to apply heightened scrutiny to antigay laws. The following Section explains why courts have
reached different conclusions.

42. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Kitchen
v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff ’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th
Cir. 2014).
43. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir. 2014); Love v.
Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d. 536, 545 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F.
Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Greigo v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M.
2013).
44. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
45. The history of same-sex marriage also shows how political actors perceive that heightened scrutiny matters because anti-gay laws cannot survive
close inspection. In the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision holding
that same-sex marriage bans were a form of sex discrimination subject to
strict scrutiny under Hawaiian law, Congress was so concerned that same-sex
marriage bans would not survive heightened scrutiny on remand that it
passed DOMA. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“Although [Hawaii’s] decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed,
some States were concerned by its implications and reaffirmed in their laws
that marriage is defined as a union between opposite-sex partners. So too in
1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) . . . .”). After the
Ninth Circuit held (in a non-marriage case) that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, Nevada stopped defending its same-sex marriage ban because its Republican leaders did not believe the ban could survive heightened
scrutiny.
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C. SCRUTINY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The Supreme Court has not clearly and consistently applied a definitive test for determining whether a classification
is suspect and, thus, warrants heightened scrutiny. From the
Court’s equal protection opinions, however, lower courts have
divined a set of functional criteria. In considering claims that
sexual orientation should be treated as a suspect classification,
courts generally evaluate four factors: (1) whether the class has
historically been subjected to discrimination; (2) whether the
class members share a defining characteristic related to their
ability to perform or contribute to society; (3) “whether the
class exhibits ‘obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group’”; and (4) “whether
46
the class is ‘a minority or politically powerless.’” Most courts
invoke these factors when discussing whether sexual orienta47
tion is a suspect classification.

46. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bowen
v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
47. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 606 (Md. 2007), abrogated
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Historically, some courts eschewed the factor test and relied on state sodomy laws to decline heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws. After the Supreme
Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), a substantive due process case, upheld the constitutionality of state sodomy laws—which criminalized private sexual conduct
between consenting adults—lower courts held that “if the government can
criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by reference to that
conduct cannot constitute a ‘suspect class.’” Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by
conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause.”). Some judges criticized this line
of reasoning by noting that Bowers did not involve any equal protection claim.
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The error
of using Bowers to deny treating sexual orientation as a suspect classification
has been abated by the Supreme Court’s reversal of Bowers in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Courts have explained that “reasoning . . . that
laws discriminating against gay men and lesbians are not entitled to heightened scrutiny because homosexual conduct may be legitimately criminalized,
cannot stand post-Lawrence.” Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 465 (Conn. 2008) (“[I ]n Lawrence v. Texas, the United
States Supreme Court overruled Bowers, thus removing the precedential underpinnings of the federal case law supporting the defendants’ claim that gay
persons are not a quasi-suspect class.”).
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This four-factor test is easier to articulate than to apply
with any consistency or precision. Laying out a numbered list
creates an appearance of structure and definiteness that is illusory because it remains unclear “how these criteria are
48
weighted or what combination triggers heightened scrutiny.”
For example, some courts believe that the first two factors are
49
more important than the last two. But other courts have required all four factors, essentially treating the four factors as
50
four elements. Yet even the Supreme Court sometimes omits
51
individual factors in its discussions.
Applying these criteria, both federal and state courts have
split on the issue of whether sexual orientation constitutes a
suspect classification. While many courts have held that laws
that discriminate against gay Americans are subject to height52
53
ened scrutiny, most courts have held to the contrary. The
48. Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper
Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 739 (2008); see also Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 168 (2011) (“The Court has
never described how the factors exist in relation to each other, explained
which factors are to be given priority, or clarified how much weight to assign
any particular factor.”).
49. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427 (“It is evident, moreover, that immutability and minority status or political powerlessness are subsidiary to the first
two primary factors . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 606.
51. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 888 n.16 (Iowa 2009) (“The Supreme Court has not required, nor even discussed, every factor in every
case.”).
52. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471,
481 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to
equal protection claims involving sexual orientation.”); Windsor v. United
States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In this case, all four factors justify heightened scrutiny: A) homosexuals as a group have historically endured
persecution and discrimination; B) homosexuality has no relation to aptitude
or ability to contribute to society; C) homosexuals are a discernible group with
non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in the subset of those
who enter same-sex marriages; and D) the class remains a politically weakened minority.”), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 989
(“Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level
of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny.”); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442
(Cal. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that sexual orientation should be viewed as a suspect classification for purposes of the California Constitution’s equal protection clause and that statutes that treat persons differently because of their
sexual orientation should be subjected to strict scrutiny under this constitutional provision.”), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D.
Cal. 2010); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412 (“[S]exual orientation constitutes a qua-

1592

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1579

first two factors are easily satisfied. First, no one seriously
challenges the fact that gay people have historically suffered
54
from significant discrimination. Courts and commentators
have noted that government officials and society at large have
subjected known and suspected homosexuals to castration, lobotomies, shock therapy, aversion therapy, witch hunts, and
widespread discrimination, making it impossible for many gay
55
people to live safe, productive, and healthy lives. Thus, courts
uniformly conclude that “gay persons have been subjected to
such severe and sustained discrimination because of our culture’s long-standing intolerance of intimate homosexual con56
duct.” Second, sexual orientation is irrelevant to one’s capabilities. Over the past two to three decades, courts have finally
come to recognize that “sexual orientation . . . bears no relation
whatsoever to an individual’s ability to perform, or to partici57
pate in, or contribute to, society.” These first two factors, thus,
si-suspect classification for purposes of the equal protection provisions of the
state constitution, and, therefore, our statutes discriminating against gay persons are subject to heightened or intermediate judicial scrutiny . . . .”); id. at
444 (stating that the court had “little difficulty in concluding that gay persons
are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political progress”).
53. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 464 (“[T]he vast majority of federal circuit
courts that have considered the issue have concluded that sexual orientation is
not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and, consequently, legislation
that classifies on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to rational basis review.”).
54. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“[H]omosexuals have
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility . . . .”); see also
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 606 (noting that there is “a history of purposeful unequal treatment” of gay and lesbian persons); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d
963, 1029 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting) (“Legal authorities do not dispute the fact that gays and lesbians have been subjected to a history of discrimination.”), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Dean
v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 344–45 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., dissenting) (“Discrimination against homosexuals has been pervasive in both the public and the private sectors.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; EVAN
GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE
FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 66 (1999) (“In fact, no court has
ever denied suspect-class status to gays and lesbians on the ground that they
have not suffered a history of discrimination.”).
55. See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609.
56. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 433.
57. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.
1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (“If homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire phenomenon of ‘staying in the [c]loset’ and of ‘coming
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are not particularly important in denying heightened scrutiny
of anti-gay laws.
Regarding the third factor, several opinions have held that
sexual orientation is not a suspect classification because homo58
sexuality is mutable. The immutability factor used to provide
the major hurdle to courts treating sexual orientation as a suspect classification. However, the significance and application of
the immutability factor have evolved. First, many courts treat
59
immutability as less important than the first two factors. Second, some courts have reframed the immutability factor to be
less about the impossibility of changing a characteristic than
about the reprehensibility of the state demanding someone
change that characteristic. The Connecticut and Iowa Supreme
Courts, for example, held that sexual orientation satisfied the
immutability factor because “the identifying trait is ‘so central
to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government
60
to penalize a person for refusing to change [it].’” Most modern
opinions, however, hold that “[s]exual orientation and sexual
61
identity are immutable.” This is consistent with the bulk of
out’ would not exist; their impediment would betray their status.”); see also
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609 (“[H]omosexual persons are subject to unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute to society . . . .”).
58. See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 616 (“In the absence of some generally
accepted scientific conclusion identifying homosexuality as an immutable
characteristic . . . we decline . . . to recognize sexual orientation as an immutable trait . . . .”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974 n.6 (noting that although the Court
“recognize[d] that th[e] question [of whether homosexuality is an immutable
trait] is being researched and debated across the country . . . and . . . offer[ed]
no opinion as to whether such a showing may be made at some later time,”
plaintiffs in that case failed to make a showing of immutability).
59. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008)
(“[I]mmutability is not invariably required in order for a characteristic to be
considered a suspect classification for equal protection purposes.”).
60. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d
699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989)); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009).
61. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); see
also High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d, 375, 377
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (“There is every reason to regard homosexuality as an immutable characteristic for equal protection purposes. . . .
Sexual identity is established at a very early age; it is not a matter of conscious or controllable choice.”); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 864
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Same-sex sexual orientation persists in all societies and has
proven to be almost completely resistant to change or ‘treatment,’ despite
widespread discrimination and social pressure against homosexuals.”), rev’d
on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 860 F. Supp. at 426 (“Sexual orientation is set in at a very early
age . . . and is not only involuntary, but is unamenable to change.”); Gay
Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1,
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scientific research, which proves that sexual orientation has a
large genetic component and is neither chosen nor changeable
62
by individual willpower. For these reasons, the immutability
factor is less of an impediment to treating sexual orientation as
a suspect classification.
With the first two factors favoring heightened scrutiny for
sexual orientation and the evolving understanding of the immutability factor, the political power inquiry has become the
focus for most courts considering whether sexual orientation is
a suspect classification. If gay Americans lack political power,
they should be entitled to heightened scrutiny. However, what
should be a relatively straightforward inquiry is anything but,
as Part II explains.
II. THE POLITICAL POWER INQUIRY
A. THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THE POLITICAL POWER
INQUIRY
The political power component of equal protection analysis
has its roots in the most famous footnote in constitutional law.
The Supreme Court in Footnote Four of Carolene Products noted the importance of “whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
63
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”
Footnote Four provided the basis for considering whether the
political process has failed to protect minority rights such that
the courts should provide more thorough oversight. Subsequent
courts have converted the footnote’s language into an inquiry
as to whether the members of a group targeted by—or disproportionately impacted by—a law or government action are politically powerless.

34–35 (D.C. 1987) (“[H]omosexuality is as deeply ingrained as heterosexuality. . . . Neither homosexuals nor heterosexuals are what they are by design.”).
62. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 787 (3d ed. 2006) (“[R]ecent research suggests that sexual orientation is
immutable and not a matter of individual choice.”); see also Jantz v. Muci, 759
F. Supp. 1543, 1547–48 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that the overwhelming majority of scientific evidence indicated that sexual orientation could not be changed
and is not subject to voluntary control).
63. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted).
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Courts and scholars have posited a range of related rationales for examining whether the members of a group lack political power before giving that group the protection of heightened
scrutiny. The equal protection doctrine—including the political
power inquiry—serves the function of correcting failures of the
64
political process. Greater scrutiny is necessary when members
of a minority “are relatively powerless to protect their interests
65
in the political process.” Conversely, groups that have meaningful political power can use the political process to protect
66
their rights, and thus do not require heightened scrutiny.
When groups cannot protect themselves through the ordinary operation of law-making and law enforcement, courts need
to more closely scrutinize laws that discriminate against those
groups. In an academic article, Justice Lewis Powell explained
that the Carolene Products opinion established that “there are
certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the political process. And the political process therefore cannot be trust67
ed to protect these groups in the way it protects most of us.”
These groups are entitled to heightened scrutiny of laws and
68
policies that discriminate against their members.
Furthermore, laws that target politically powerless groups
69
are more likely to reflect prejudice. The Supreme Court in
Cleburne noted that “when a statute classifies by race, alien-

64. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 80 (1980); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”:
Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA.
L. REV. 975, 981 (2014) (“[A] fundamental justification for the suspect class
doctrine . . . [is] to correct political process failures.”); see also GERSTMANN,
supra note 54, at 27 (“The challenge, then, is for the Court to properly identify
those groups that are so powerless or despised that they cannot effectively
participate in the pluralistic political process. These groups are ‘suspect classes’ and should be strongly protected by the courts.”).
65. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973).
66. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726–27 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris,
J., concurring) (“Courts are understandably reluctant to extend heightened
protection under equal protection doctrine to groups fully capable of securing
their rights through the political process.”).
67. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1087, 1089 (1982).
68. Id. (noting that courts should use heightened scrutiny to review legislation that would harm minorities because they are unable to protect themselves in the legislative process).
69. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 712 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (“Discriminations that burden some despised or politically powerless
groups are so likely to reflect antipathy against those groups that the classifications are inherently suspect and must be strictly scrutinized.”).
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age, or national origin[,] . . . such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the bur70
dened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.” If the
targeted group does not have political power, then prejudice
can prevail and lawmakers have little incentive to protect that
71
minority’s rights. This combination of prejudice and political
powerlessness warrants requiring the government to prove that
the challenged law is “suitably tailored to serve a compelling
72
state interest.”
Different courts have afforded varying weight to the political power inquiry. On the one hand, some judges and scholars
have taken the position that political powerlessness is not nec73
essary to entitle a group to heightened scrutiny. For example,
some federal judges have held that political powerlessness “is
not essential for recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect
74
class.” Similarly, some states do not require political power75
lessness as an element. Other judges, however, have observed
70. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see
also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008) (“[A]s
a minority group that continues to suffer the enduring effects of centuries of
legally sanctioned discrimination, laws singling [gay persons] out for disparate
treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that those laws
are not the product of such historical prejudice and stereotyping.”).
71. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The ‘political powerlessness’ of a group and the immutability of its defining trait are relevant insofar as they point to a social and
cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group’s interests and needs.”).
72. Id. at 440 (“For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to
strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.”).
73. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989–90 (S.D.
Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014),
rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (“Lack of political
power is not essential for recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect class . . . .”);
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009) (“Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes that a group’s current political powerlessness is not a prerequisite to enhanced judicial protection.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection
Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 6 (2010) (detailing the history of political
powerlessness as a consideration in equal protection cases).
74. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2014), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Whitewood v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Health, 621 Fed. App’x
141 (3d Cir. 2015).
75. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) (“Although some California decisions in discussing suspect classifications have referred to a group’s ‘political powerlessness’, our cases have not identified a
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that although political powerlessness is not strictly required,
76
the factor can help establish heightened scrutiny. Some courts
give less weight to the political power factor than other fac77
tors. One reason that some courts have not emphasized the
political power factor is the difficulty in applying the factor
across different groups. For example, the Connecticut Supreme
Court noted that “the court has accorded little weight to a
group’s political power because that factor, in contrast to the
other criteria, frequently is not readily discernible by reference
78
to objective standards.”
Conversely, many other courts have treated the political
79
power inquiry as highly relevant. For example, in San Antonio
80
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
denied heightened scrutiny to the poor, in part because they
have not been “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the ma81
Professor Darren Lenard
joritarian political process.”
group’s current political powerlessness as a necessary prerequisite for treatment as a suspect class.”).
76. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The ‘political powerlessness’ of a group may be relevant,
but that factor is neither necessary, as the gender cases demonstrate, nor sufficient, as the example of minors illustrates.”); Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at
989 (“Lack of political power is not essential for recognition as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, but the limited ability of gay people as a group to protect
themselves in the political process also weighs in favor of heightened scrutiny
of laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation.” (citation omitted));
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.2d 968, 989 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (noting that the political powerlessness “factor is not an absolute prerequisite for heightened scrutiny,” though finding that gay men and lesbians
lack political power).
77. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 454 n.52 (Conn.
2008) (“[T]o the extent that the Supreme Court has considered the political
power of a group in determining whether it is entitled to suspect or quasisuspect class status, it has accorded that prong the least amount of weight.”).
78. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 428 (“Thus, an attempt to quantify a group’s political influence often will involve a myriad of complex and interrelated considerations of a kind not readily susceptible to judicial fact-finding.”).
79. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 466 (Baxter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[S]everal courts holding that sexual orientation is not a suspect class have focused particularly on a determination that,
in contemporary times at least, the gay and lesbian community does not lack
political power.”); see also Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1015 (“Frontiero,
Plyler, and Rowland all lead to the conclusion that Brennan (and the Court)
has considered political powerlessness relevant to the suspect class doctrine
and to the application of heightened scrutiny.”).
80. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
81. Id. at 28.
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Hutchinson has noted that “legal scholars and courts have
overwhelmingly treated political powerlessness as a significant
82
factor in the suspect class doctrine.” Indeed, some scholars argue that courts sometimes treat political powerlessness as the
83
most important criterion.
Most importantly for our purposes, courts have treated the
political power inquiry as dispositive when holding that sexual
orientation is not a suspect classification. For example, in evaluating its state ban on same-sex marriage, the Maryland Court
of Appeals concluded:
While there is a history of purposeful unequal treatment of gay and
lesbian persons, and homosexual persons are subject to unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute to society,
we shall not hold that gay and lesbian persons are so politically pow84
erless that they constitute a suspect class.

A federal district court considering the military’s prohibition on
gay servicemembers “reject[ed] plaintiff’s argument that homosexuals constitute a suspect class” because “[a]lthough plaintiff
may have submitted sufficient evidence to create a triable issue
of material fact as to whether homosexuality is an ‘immutable’
characteristic, he has failed to submit any pertinent evidence
85
tending to establish that homosexuals lack legislative power.”
Similarly, the trial court in Romer held that “[h]omosexuals fail
to meet the element of political powerlessness and therefore fail
86
to meet the elements to be found a suspect class.” These cases

82. Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1016; see also Levy, supra note 1, at 44
(“[R]elative political powerlessness was an important consideration in many
cases recognizing or declining to recognize a suspect class or classification, and
the Court has never rejected it as a factor in determining whether to heighten
scrutiny.”).
83. E.g., Strauss, supra note 48, at 153 (“[S]ome courts consider political
powerlessness to be the ultimate question and view the other factors as
subissues.”).
84. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609 (Md. 2007). The court also declined to find that sexual orientation was immutable, but the court suggested
that its decision on immutability was influenced by its earlier holding that gay
people were not politically powerless. See id. at 616 (“In the absence of some
generally accepted scientific conclusion identifying homosexuality as an immutable characteristic, and in light of the other indicia used by this Court and
the Supreme Court in defining a suspect class, we decline on the record in the
present case to recognize sexual orientation as an immutable trait and therefore a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.”).
85. Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
86. Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *12 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), aff ’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff ’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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demonstrate that the political power factor can be decisive in
87
denying heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE POLITICAL POWER INQUIRY
The political power factor can be both controlling and confusing. This Section reviews several critiques of the factor.
First, it remains unclear how political power is measured, as
illustrated by the conflicting approaches that courts have taken
regarding the political power of gay people. Second, comparing
groups granted heightened scrutiny to those denied heightened
scrutiny exposes important inconsistencies in equal protection
jurisprudence. Finally, this Section explores how courts have
made the political power factor impossible to satisfy.
1. The Measurement of Political Power
While judges have discussed political power for decades,
they have never developed any accepted criteria for measuring
such power. By way of a case study, courts have split on the
factual question of whether gays are politically powerless because courts have employed different measurement criteria and
have sometimes interpreted the same standard dissimilarly to
88
reach contradictory conclusions. For example, judges finding
that gays have considerable political power note that some laws
89
exist to protect gay people’s rights. Such judges have also

87. See GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 81 (“Thus, along with the perception that homosexuality is a behavioral rather than an immutable characteristic, the perception of substantial gay and lesbian political power has proven to
be a major obstacle to gays and lesbians attaining suspect-class status.”); see
also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 454 (Conn. 2008) (noting that dissent’s “view [that] gay persons are not entitled to heightened protection, even though they meet the first three criteria, because the political
power of gay persons overrides those three considerations”).
88. Compare Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (S.D. Ohio
2013) (“As political power has been defined by the Supreme Court for purposes
of heightened scrutiny analysis, gay people do not have it.”), rev’d sub nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), with Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609 (“[W]e shall
not hold that gay and lesbian persons are so politically powerless that they
constitute a suspect class.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
89. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013), and Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.
2008), as recognized in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d
471 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 466–67 (Cal. 2008)
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting), superseded by constitutional amend-
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tried to lower the bar for proving that gays have political power
by arguing that it is sufficient that gays can attract the atten90
tion of lawmakers. Conversely, courts finding that gays lack
political power often emphasize the absence of relevant laws to
91
protect gay Americans from discrimination. Furthermore, these courts have noted that the existence of anti-gay laws shows
92
that gays do not have political power.
Putting gay legislative victories in context, many judges
have emphasized the difficulty that gays face trying to overcome the deep-seated prejudice against members of the LGBT
community. Most notably, in the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to consider the issue, Justice William Brennan, joined by
Justice Thurgood Marshall, recognized that gay people “are
particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been the
object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say
that discrimination against homosexuals is ‘likely . . . to reflect
93
deep-seated prejudice rather than . . . rationality.’” Building
on this theme, the Second Circuit explained that “[t]he question
is not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes
ment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (2008), as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
90. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574; Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1102
(D. Haw. 2012), vacated, 585 Fed. App’x 413 (9th Cir. 2014); Dahl, 830 F.
Supp. at 1324.
91. E.g., Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (“One way gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals’ lack of power is demonstrated is by the absence of statutory
protections for them.”); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 (M.D. Pa.
2014) (“While the gay rights movement has undoubtedly gained recognition as
a vigorous force and has influenced public policy to some extent, there remains
an absence of statutory, anti-discrimination protections which may indicate
continuing political weakness.”); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 960
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (“The fact that gays and lesbians lack significant political
power in Michigan is amply demonstrated by the fact that there are no laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation . . . .”); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894–95 (Iowa 2009) (noting the absence of inclusive
marriage laws); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 461 (“[T]he political advances
that gay persons have attained afford them inadequate protection . . . .”).
92. E.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 652 (W.D. Tex. 2014)
(“[T]he history of same-sex marriage bans across the nation illustrates the historical lack of political power possessed by gays and lesbians.”); Golinski v.
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting
“there is no federal anti-discrimination legislation and no protection in most
states from sexual orientation discrimination”).
93. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14
(1982)).
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over the years; they clearly have. The question is whether they
have the strength to politically protect themselves from wrong94
ful discrimination.” This, gay Americans cannot yet do, as the
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that “the relatively modest
political influence that gay persons possess is insufficient to
rectify the invidious discrimination to which they have been
95
subjected for so long.” Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that “gay and lesbian people are not so politically powerful as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that history
suggests produces discrimination based on sexual orienta96
tion.” Gay people have to overcome so much historical prejudice that true political power, including the ability to make political compromises with other more powerful groups, is still
97
inaccessible despite some isolated successes. In contrast, those
courts finding that gays have political power ignore this dynamic and argue that just because gays are targeted by anti98
gay laws does not mean that they do not have political power.
Courts have also diverged in their treatment of the significance of openly gay elected lawmakers. The Seventh Circuit
found political power in the fact that “[Time Magazine] reports
94. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012); see also
Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (“In sum, the basic inability to bring about an
end to discrimination and pervasive prejudice, to secure desired policy outcomes and to prevent undesirable outcomes on fundamental matters that directly impact their lives, is evidence of the relative political powerlessness of
gay and lesbian individuals.”).
95. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 461.
96. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 895; see also Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865,
882–83 (N.M. 2013) (“Refocusing on the contention that the LGBT community
is not politically powerless, we recognize that they have had some recent political success regarding legislation prohibiting discrimination against them.
However, we also conclude that effective advocacy for the LGBT community is
seriously hindered by their continuing need to overcome the already deeprooted prejudice against their integration into society, which warrants our application of intermediate scrutiny in this case.”).
97. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 937 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
98. E.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing trial court holding that gay people constitute a quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny), vacated, 518 U.S.
1001 (1996); Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *11–12 (D.
Colo. 1993); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986) (upholding Missouri’s sodomy law under rational basis review), abrogated by Glossip v. Mo.
Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps. Ret. Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796 (Mo.
2013); see also Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1001 (critiquing trial court’s
analysis in Evans v. Romer); Emily K. Baxter, Rationalizing Away Political
Powerlessness: Equal Protection Analysis of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbians, 72 MO. L. REV. 891, 903–04 (2007) (same).
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that one congressman is an avowed homosexual, and that there
is a charge that five other top officials are known to be homo99
sexual.” The court did not explain how this created political
power sufficient to eliminate the need for heightened scrutiny.
Conversely, more courts have noted that exceedingly few gay
100
individuals hold positions of power. These low numbers limit
the ability of gay people “to prevent legislation hostile to their
101
group interests.” Some courts note that pointing to the rare
examples of openly gay politicians better illustrates a lack of
102
political power rather than its abundance.
Courts also disagree on the legal implications of the closet.
For example, one Nevada district court judge, in holding that
gays have political power, argued that gays did not have it so
bad because, although sodomy laws had criminalized the very
identity of gay men and lesbians, “the need or desire to keep

99. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that “[h]omosexuals are not without political power”); see also Kerrigan,
957 A.2d at 441 (indicating that the defendants unsuccessfully argued “that
gay persons are not entirely without political power” in part “because some
gay persons serve openly in public office”).
100. E.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 447 (“No openly gay person ever has been
appointed to a United States Cabinet position or to any federal appeals court.
In addition, no openly gay person has served in the United States Senate, and
only two currently serve in the United States House of Representatives.”); see
also Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 1030 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., concurring in dissent) (“But there are other indicators. In Washington, there are
only four openly gay legislators—none in a statewide executive or judicial capacity.”), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Courtney
A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of
LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 394–95 (2010) (“The current number of LGBTs
serving in our law-making institutions is far short of proportional representation. Only .69%, or three, members of Congress are openly LGBT. Only .01%,
or seventy-four, of our states’ legislative representatives are openly LGBT.”).
101. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Norris, J., concurring in the judgment).
102. See Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The recent articles BLAG cites are exceptions and not the
rule. While President Obama nominated four openly-gay judges, there are literally hundreds of federal judges nationwide.”).
For a critique of counting public representatives to measure a group’s political power, see Strauss, supra note 48, at 159 (“Determining a group’s political powerlessness by the number of public representatives of that group in positions of power suffers from three problems. First, numbers are not an
accurate measure of power. Second, courts do not employ a clear definition of
underrepresentation or adequate representation. Third, this factor suggests
that the level of scrutiny must be constantly reevaluated over time, a task that
is not embraced by courts.”).
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one’s sexual orientation secret because of such laws, though
perhaps regrettable, would have no effect on one’s ability to
vote, serve on a jury, or otherwise participate in American de103
mocracy.” Most courts to consider the issue, however, recognize that the ability of gay Americans to exert political influence is significantly diminished by the fact that discrimination
forces gay people to conceal their sexual orientation. For example, a federal judge in Kansas noted that when gay people are
forced to conceal their sexual orientation in order to avoid “the
harsh penalties imposed by society on persons identified as
homosexual . . . [i]t may allow a given individual to escape from
the discrimination, abuse, and even violence which is often directed at homosexuals, but it ensures that homosexuals as a
104
group are unheard politically.” This echoes Justice Brennan’s
observation: “Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium
often manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue
105
their rights openly in the political arena.” Fear of public hostility and prejudice, including physical violence, keeps many
106
gays, including legislators, in the closet. Closeted representa107
tives often do not protect the LGBT community, and often are
among the most aggressively anti-gay legislators, in an attempt
108
to conceal their homosexuality. Ultimately, the closet prevents gay people from mobilizing to advance a pro-equality po109
litical agenda, and that means that “the voices of many ho110
mosexuals are not even heard, let alone counted.”
103. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1011 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d
sub nom. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
104. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d on other
grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Dean v. District of Columbia,
653 A.2d 307, 349 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Prejudice has prevented some homosexuals from coming out of the
‘closet’ and joining gay rights organizations that can increase their political
power.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
105. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (S.D. Ohio 2013),
rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
107. Powers, supra note 100, at 394.
108. See, e.g., ROBERT BAUMAN, THE GENTLEMAN FROM MARYLAND: THE
CONSCIENCE OF A GAY CONSERVATIVE (1986) (giving an autobiographical account of the life of a closeted, “ultraconservative” congressman who was arrested by the FBI for soliciting sex with an underage male prostitute).
109. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Mo-
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In concluding that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, many courts have examined relative political power.
Some courts finding gays to satisfy the political powerlessness
factor have noted that “the standard is not whether a minority
group is entirely powerless, but rather whether they suffer
111
from relative political weakness.” While gay Americans have
achieved greater political and social acceptance as they have
come out of the closet and disproved prejudice-based stereotypes, any absolute gains are offset and diminished by the political influence of opponents of gay rights who are often more
powerful, with deep pockets and an obsession for opposing
112
equal rights. Because of this organized opposition, gays must
work harder and longer to achieve basic rights, which suggests

rality and the Trial of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1057,
1067–68 (1994) (noting that Professor Kenneth Sherrill has “explained that
the fear of many lesbians, gay men and bisexuals of identifying themselves
and coming together for public advocacy inhibits political organizing”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1994) (“Precisely because [homosexuals] are often anonymous (that is, not known to be
homosexual) and diffuse (that is, not tightly organized), they face large barriers to exerting adequate political influence. . . . The ability to conceal can actually make things worse from the standpoint of exercising political power.”).
110. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Norris, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In addition, homosexuals as a group
are handicapped by structural barriers that operate to make effective political
participation unlikely if not impossible. First, the social, economic, and political pressures to conceal one’s homosexuality operate to discourage gays from
openly protesting anti-homosexual governmental action.”); see also Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 349–50 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
111. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 n.7
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) and San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
112. DAVID RAYSIDE, ON THE FRINGE: GAYS AND LESBIANS IN POLITICS 14
(1998) (“[I]n the United States, . . . opponents of gay and lesbian rights have
been able to mobilize grassroots support on a scale unimaginable for gay activist organizations.”); see also RAYSIDE, supra, at 9 (“But any analysis of the political significance of such resources [controlled by gay Americans] must take
into account the extraordinary power of the American Christian right.”); Kenji
Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme
Court, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 527, 538 (2012) (noting that in the litigation over
California’s Proposition 8, “Professor Gary Segura of Stanford . . . observed
that the political power of opponents to gay rights (specifically certain religious denominations) significantly diminished the political power of the gay
community”).
Even when the LGBT community obtains political success, their gains are
often repealed through referenda. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 883 (N.M.
2013).
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that gays suffer a relative deficit of political power. In contrast to the above analysis, those courts asserting that gay people have significant political power have not considered these
issues of relativity.
This brief review of how courts have evaluated the political
power of gay Americans demonstrates how difficult it is to
measure political power with any precision or consistency.
What exactly courts mean by political powerlessness remains
114
elusive. There are many indicia that courts sometimes invoke, but there is no uniformity across cases. Even when judges
agree on what gets weighed, disagreement prevails on how to
115
weigh.
2. The Symmetry of Political Power
Courts have been unable to apply a coherent standard of
“politically powerless” across groups. This failure is evident in
the incongruence of which groups receive heightened scrutiny
compared to gay people. For example, women get heightened
116
scrutiny even though they are a majority of the population
117
and have more political power than gays; indeed, gay Americans have less political power now than women did when the
Supreme Court provided intermediate scrutiny to women in the
118
1970s. Similarly, as a political force, gay Americans arguably

113. See Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1005.
114. See Lawrence Friedman, Not the Usual Suspects: Suspect Classification Determinations and Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions, 50 WASHBURN L.J.
61, 76 (2010) (“Application of that factor involves inquiries into the meaning of
political events that may well defy judicial understanding or the possibility of
judicial limitation; political events often cannot be reduced to a single meaning.”).
115. See id. at 75–76.
116. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 338 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“And, of course, women are not a
minority.”); see also Levy, supra note 1, at 42 (“It is hard to see how complete
political powerlessness could be a requirement in light of Frontiero and Craig
v. Boren, insofar as women make up at least half of the voting population.”).
117. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (S.D. Ohio 2013)
(“The relative lack of political influence of gay people today stands in contrast
to the political power of women in 1973, when a plurality of the Court concluded in [Frontiero] that sex-based classifications required heightened scrutiny.”);
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 461 (Conn. 2008) (“Today,
moreover, women have far greater political power than gay persons, yet they
continue to be accorded status as a quasi-suspect class.”); Powers, supra note
100, at 395.
118. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895 (Iowa 2009) (“Gays and lesbians certainly possess no more political power than women enjoyed four dec-
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119

have less power than African Americans. Yet courts that hold
gays have too much political power to receive heightened scru120
tiny never compare the two groups. There is simply no reasonable way to reconcile the political power analysis of those
cases that deny heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws and those
121
that afford such protection to women and racial minorities.
Moreover, because courts have treated gender and race as
suspect classifications—instead of simply treating women and
racial minorities as protected classes—laws that adversely af122
fect men and Caucasians also receive heightened scrutiny.
Thus, the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to
ades ago when the Supreme Court began subjecting gender-based legislation
to closer scrutiny.”); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 452 (“With respect to the comparative political power of gay persons, they presently have no greater political
power—in fact, they undoubtedly have a good deal less such influence—than
women did in 1973, when the United States Supreme Court, in Frontiero, held
that women are entitled to heightened judicial protection.”).
119. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 453 (“[G]ay persons clearly lack the political
power that African-Americans and women possess today.”); Dean, 653 A.2d at
351 (“[H]omosexuals—because of their tendency, overall, toward anonymity
and diffusion, rather than discreetness and insularity—tend to have considerably less political power than African-Americans, a protected racial minority.”).
120. GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 83 (“[C]ourts are applying a very different standard to gays and lesbians than they have been applying to other
groups. No court has been willing to evaluate the political power of women or
racial minorities by the same standard that they have applied to gays and lesbians.”); see also Baxter, supra note 98, at 904.
121. See GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 81 (“The only logical standard of
comparison is other suspect or quasi-suspect classes such as racial minorities
or women. If these groups are sufficiently powerless to be suspect or quasisuspect classes, then logically gays and lesbians must be, at a minimum, more
politically powerful than these groups if they are in fact too powerful to be a
suspect or quasi-suspect class.”).
One could argue that courts focus on the classification when dealing with
race and gender, but focus on the class when dealing with anti-gay laws. But
this is an explanation, not a reconciliation. Why, after all, should courts look
at classifications for some equal protection claims and classes for others?
122. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (finding
that male jurors have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures
that are free from historical prejudice); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (“That this statutory policy discriminates against males
rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the
standard of review.”).
This suspect classification approach is inconsistent with a political power
requirement because both men and women cannot be politically powerless,
just as both whites and nonwhites cannot simultaneously lack political power.
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 502–
03 (2004).
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strike down a state law that allowed women between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-one to purchase low-alcohol beer, but
123
not similarly aged men. The men bringing the suit were not
124
required to prove lack of political power; they could not have.
Similarly, laws that affect white people adversely receive
125
heightened scrutiny from courts. When white plaintiffs challenge affirmative action policies as violating the Equal Protec126
tion Clause, courts have applied strict scrutiny. These plaintiffs have never had to show that white people are politically
powerless. Courts have avoided the inquiry because it would be
ludicrous to conclude that white people in America do not have
political power when they occupy the vast majority of seats in
Congress and every state legislature. Thus, race-based classifications receive strict scrutiny without any inquiry into the
127
plaintiffs’ political power.
Caucasians and men receive heightened scrutiny because
courts are applying the anti-classification theory of equal protection, as opposed to the anti-subordination theory. While anti-classification theory may provide a justification for treating
all racial and gender classifications as suspect, courts have explained neither why sexual orientation is an acceptable classification nor why the political power factor is employed against
gay plaintiffs but not white or male plaintiffs pursuing equal
protection claims. No court that has refused to apply heightened scrutiny to anti-gay laws has ever attempted to explain
how gay Americans have too much political power to qualify for
greater protection but Caucasians and men do not. Because
this state of affairs is indefensible, courts do not defend it; most
courts, however, choose to perpetuate it. All of this illustrates
an asymmetry in the application of the political power factor
that suggests that courts are, at best, inconsistent and, at
worst, disingenuous.

123. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
124. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 12–13 (“Moreover, the Court’s gender discrimination cases often involved male plaintiffs who were disadvantaged by
gender-based state policies, such as Oklahoma’s rule that eighteen- to twentyyear-old women could purchase three percent beer but same-aged men could
not—the policy struck down in Craig v. Boren. At almost half of the population, and by far the wealthier half, men are far from politically powerless.”).
125. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
126. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–96 (1989).
127. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 12 (“If political powerlessness was a requirement for strict scrutiny, almost all of these affirmative action cases were
wrongly decided.”).
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3. The Impossibility of Political Powerlessness
Another major problem with the political power inquiry is
that courts apply the factor impractically in a manner that is
all but impossible to satisfy. In order to establish that it is politically powerless and entitled to heightened scrutiny, a group
128
must have some modicum of political power. Women and racial minorities, for example, did not receive heightened scrutiny
129
until they had attained sufficient political power. The truly
130
powerless do not receive protection from the courts because
131
that group “will never even get on the Court’s radar” and “the
132
Court will not even recognize its existence.” Professor Kenji
Yoshino refers to this phenomenon as “the paradox of political
133
power.”

128. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 24–25 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court’s practice inverts the demands of the political powerlessness requirement. When a
social group is totally powerless, the Court will not subject the group’s stigmatizing trait to heightened scrutiny. Once the minority has achieved some political power, then the Court may intervene with strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, or rational basis with bite.”); Yoshino, supra note 112, at 539 (“As a
matter of practice, a group usually must have significant political power before
the Court grants it heightened scrutiny.”).
129. Yoshino, supra note 112, at 541–42 (“When women were granted
heightened scrutiny in 1976, the Congress had passed the Equal Rights
Amendment and many states had ratified it.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 894 (Iowa 2009).
It may seem odd to talk about the political power of women and racial minorities if heightened protection for gender and racial discrimination are
based on anti-classification theory, and not anti-subordination theory. But the
fact that women and racial minorities did not receive heightened scrutiny until they had sufficient political power suggests that the boundary between anti-classification theory and anti-subordination theory is porous and confusing.
130. See Eskridge, supra note 73, at 19 (“The hypothesis that emerges from
these cases is that, as a matter of its own practice, the U.S. Supreme Court
will not provide a high level of equal protection scrutiny when the state is deploying a suspicious classification against a minority that is totally powerless.”).
131. Yoshino, supra note 112, at 539.
132. Id. at 541.
133. Id. (“A paradox of political power attends judicial review. It could be
stated as follows: A group must have an immense amount of political power
before it will be deemed politically powerless by the Court.”).
The dynamic plays out in the relationship between state and federal protection of minorities. The Supreme Court generally will not move much more
quickly than the majority of states have moved on a particular issue. For example, the Supreme Court declined to hold miscegenation laws and sodomy
laws unconstitutional until the vast majority of states had already repealed or
invalidated these laws. The Court’s inclination to wait until the states have
acted creates a problem, however, because if the states have moved to protect
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For decades, gay people were too politically powerless to
have their claims taken seriously by the judiciary. When, in the
1970s, gay couples first argued that same-sex marriage bans
were unconstitutional, courts rejected the couples’ constitution134
al arguments out of hand, often “without discussion.” The
Supreme Court dismissed appeals of such losses “for want of a
substantial federal question,” despite the fact that same-sex
couples were arguing that the challenged marriage prohibitions
135
violated the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s disdain for the
rights of gay people was hardly surprising given that the Supreme Court in Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser136
vice held that “Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic
personality’ to include homosexuals” and that homosexuals
137
were properly excluded from the country. Professor Eskridge
has explained that “[o]ne sad lesson from Boutilier is that if a
minority group is totally powerless, because of social prejudice
or pervasive stereotyping, the Equal Protection Clause will not
138
protect that group.” In short, the same social prejudice that
produces anti-gay laws leads judges to protect these laws from
139
judicial invalidation.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will only label a group as
politically powerless if the group can hit an undefined sweet
spot with the perfect combination of the presence and absence
140
of political power. As the judicial treatment of gay people
a group, then courts might claim that this shows that the group has political
power and is, thus, not entitled to heightened scrutiny.
134. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 n.2 (1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972).
135. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
136. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
137. Id. at 120.
138. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 18.
139. See id. (“If social prejudice is so pervasive, will not judges themselves
be prejudiced, to some extent, against the minority group? Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black, leaders of the Warren Court revolution in race and
criminal procedure, were prejudiced against gay people. It was easy for such
judges to believe that all males who have ever had sex with men were ‘homosexuals,’ that ‘homosexuals’ are ‘psychopaths,’ and that judges should support
state pogroms against such ‘psychopathic’ people.”).
140. See id. at 19 (“Heightened scrutiny will be possible only once the minority group has shown some political power, albeit not enough to sweep away
all of the encrusted, and irrational or unproductive, discrimination against its
members.”).
One could argue that noncitizens did not have political power when the
Supreme Court decided Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The Gra-
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shows, that sweet spot may not exist. For decades, gays were
141
legally labeled as psychopaths and criminals, labels that were
both a cause and a consequence of gay people being politically
142
powerless. Courts sometimes used the lack of legislative protection for gay people as the reason to deny heightened scrutiny
and, thus, reduce any judicial protection for gay people target143
ed by discriminatory laws. But any movement towards equality was used against gay people seeking heightened scrutiny of
144
remaining anti-gay laws. In short, the necessary sweet spot of
“political powerlessness” is either ephemeral or fictional.
III. A GEOGRAPHICAL LENS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS
A. THE LOCUS OF DISCRIMINATION
Gay Americans live in every state, in every county, of the
United States. Wherever they live, gay people face the risk—
and often, the reality—of discrimination by their own government. This Section reviews how all levels of government have
discriminated against, and failed to protect, the LGBT population.
1. Federal Discrimination
The federal government has actively and passively supported discrimination against gay Americans. First, Congress
and federal agencies have enacted unequivocally anti-gay laws
and policies. During the mid-to-late twentieth century, Congress excluded homosexuals from immigrating by labeling them
145
as psychopathic personalities. The federal government has
long discriminated against gay employees in ways both subtle
and overt. President Eisenhower issued an executive order to
prohibit all homosexuals from all government employment.
ham Court never mentioned political power in its opinion.
141. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted
by ‘Unenforced’ Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104 (2000) (explaining how sodomy laws stigmatize gays by labeling them as criminals).
142. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 26–27.
143. See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979),
abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
144. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614 n.56 (Md. 2007) (“The irony
is not lost on us that the increasing political and other successes of the expression of gay power works against Appellees in this part of our analysis of the
level of scrutiny to be given the statute under review.”).
145. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
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During the McCarthy era, “literally thousands of men and
women were discharged or forced to resign from civilian positions in the federal government because they were suspected of
146
being gay or lesbian.” For the entirety of the twentieth century, the U.S. military officially forbade openly gay and lesbian
Americans from serving their country in uniform. Congress
codified this policy in 1993 with the so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” (DADT) policy, “pursuant to which a service member who
has engaged in, intends to engage in or is likely to engage in
homosexual conduct will be ordered separated from the armed
147
services.” When states began to consider recognizing samesex marriage, Congress passed the misnamed Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prohibited federal agencies from
treating legally married same-sex couples as being married for
the purposes of federal law, including for tax, immigration, and
Social Security purposes, among others.
Although the most strident anti-gay federal policies are no
longer in place, the successes in eliminating them largely come
not from the political power of gays but from judicial protection.
Courts, for example, were critical in reversing the federal gov148
ernment’s anti-gay employment policies. More recently, when
Congress did eventually repeal DADT in 2011, it did so in the
shadow of a federal court decision invalidating the policy as unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the federal govern149
ment from enforcing the policy. Judicial action, in this case,
spurred and informed the legislative action. And DOMA would
still prevent federal recognition of same-sex marriage but for
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Windsor, striking the law
150
down.
146. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432–33 n.25 (Conn.
2008) (quoting GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING
TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 6 (2004)); see also DAVID JOHNSON, THE
LAVENDER SCARE (2004) (describing the persecution of gays and lesbians during the McCarthy era).
147. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432 n.25.
148. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that
an employee’s alleged homosexuality did not justify dismissal); Scott v. Macy,
402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (reversing an action of the United States Civil
Service Commission denying an applicant public employment “on the ground
that he had engaged in ‘immoral conduct’”); Soc’y for Individual Rights, Inc. v.
Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (reinstating a gay employee who had
been improperly discharged from his federal civil service position).
149. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929
(C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011).
150. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see infra note 238
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Furthermore, Congress has declined to pass antidiscrimination laws to protect gay Americans. For over four
decades, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) has
been introduced in Congress. ENDA would merely add sexual
orientation to the categories of characteristics on which employers may not discriminate. Despite the fact that a majority
of Americans support the measure, Congress has failed to pro151
tect gay workers against invidious discrimination. In addition
to ENDA, Congress has declined to enact proposed legislation
that would address health disparities for LGBT Americans and
152
improve their access to the health care system. Before Windsor and Obergefell made same-sex marriages legal across the
country, Congress refused to pass legislation to “prohibit the
taxation of benefits provided for domestic partners under employers’ health plans” and to “permit Americans to sponsor
153
their same-sex partner for family-based immigration.” If gay
Americans really had political power at the federal level, it
would be relatively easy to include sexual orientation into existing nondiscrimination laws.
Finally, Congress has explicitly carved out gay Americans
from the protection of broad-based civil rights legislation. For
example, when Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, it unequivocally excluded gay men, lesbians,
154
Even
and bisexuals from protection from discrimination.
when adopting the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Congress
stipulated that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed, nor
shall any funds appropriated to carry out the purpose of the Act
155
be used, to promote or encourage homosexuality.” While less
harmful than aggressively discriminatory policies, like DADT
and DOMA, these carve-outs communicate Congress’s disdain
and disrespect for gay Americans.

(discussing the irony of anti-gay legislators defending DOMA while claiming
that gays have too much political power to qualify for heightened scrutiny).
151. Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 955, 964 (2012); William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An
Empirical Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 69–72 (2001).
152. Powers, supra note 100, at 396 n.87.
153. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012) (“[H]omosexuality and bisexuality are not
impairments and as such are not disabilities under this chapter.”).
155. Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140
§ 2(b); see also Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime into Focus—the
Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 278 (1991).
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2. State Discrimination
State-based anti-gay discrimination has been a distinct
problem for gay Americans since the nation’s founding. Until
the 1960s, every state in the union criminalized homosexual
conduct through sodomy laws. These laws made private samesex activity between consenting adults illegal. Criminal penalties were excessive to the point of irrational cruelty. As of the
mid-1950s, at least nine states had a twenty-year maximum
sentence for such private conduct, Connecticut had a thirtyyear maximum sentence and North Carolina had sixty years;
the laws of Colorado, Georgia, and Nevada provided for a life
156
sentence for a sodomy conviction. States, however, did not
primarily enforce their sodomy laws through criminal prosecutions. Various state boards relied on sodomy laws to deny professional licenses to gay men and lesbians in many fields, in157
cluding medicine, law, and teaching. Many private employers
followed suit and maintained policies against employing gay
158
men and lesbians, who were considered de facto criminals.
Sodomy laws were also used to deny redress to any gay man or
lesbian fired on account of sexual orientation. The courts reasoned that if gay men and lesbians were criminals because of
their sexual orientation, surely their sexual orientation could
159
not be the basis for an employment discrimination claim.
Sodomy laws were also used to rationalize taking children
away from their gay parents, to prevent gays from organizing
to protect their rights, and to justify discrimination against gay
160
161
men and lesbians in immigration, housing, and enforce162
ment of solicitation statutes. Finally, sodomy laws also en163
couraged anti-gay violence and deterred police departments
156. Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., An Evaluation of the Homosexual Offender, 41
MINN. L. REV. 187, 190 (1957).
157. Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 509, 512–13 (2005) (“Mere suspicion of homosexuality was
enough to fire a teacher for violating the state’s sodomy law.”).
158. Id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the
Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and
Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 911 (1997) (“In 1961, virtually all state and federal government agencies discriminated against employees
thought to be gay or lesbian, a discrimination aped by the private sector.”).
159. E.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
160. Leslie, supra note 141, at 164–68.
161. State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992).
162. Leslie, supra note 141, at 162–63.
163. Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 209, 233; see also Leslie, supra note 141, at 122–27.
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164

from protecting gay victims of crimes. In short, even gay men
and lesbians who did not violate sodomy laws were considered
presumptive felons and, consequently, discriminated against.
States slowly began to abolish their sodomy laws, until the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003 ruled them unconstitutional. But the discrimination regarding employment and
family law—often associated with sodomy laws—remained in
most jurisdictions.
The family law regimes of many states are infused with
anti-gay prejudice. When same-sex couples sought marriage
equality, most states amended their state constitutions or civil
codes to explicitly prohibit any legal recognition of same-sex
marriages. Although Obergefell has extended the constitutional
right to marry to include same-sex couples, many states continue to discriminate against gay families. For example, some
165
states expressly prohibit adoptions by gays and lesbians. As
with federal anti-gay laws, their demise is more likely through
166
judicial invalidation than legislative repeal.
Like the federal government, most states have declined to
protect their gay citizens and visitors from invidious discrimination; both private and governmental actors are free to dis167
criminate against members of the LGBT community. In the
aftermath of Obergefell, many states are proposing so-called religious freedom laws that would explicitly authorize and em168
power discrimination against gay individuals and couples.
164. Leslie, supra note 141, at 124–25.
165. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2016) (“Adoption by couples of
the same gender is prohibited.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-102(4) (LexisNexis
2012) (“The Legislature specifically finds that it is not in a child’s best interest
to be adopted by a person or persons who are cohabiting in a relationship that
is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.”).
Michigan amended its adoption laws to allow publicly funded adoption agencies to refuse adoptions to same-sex couples if this conflicts with the agency’s
religious beliefs. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.23g (West 2015).
166. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45
So. 3d 79, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (striking down Florida’s prohibition on
gays adopting children).
167. Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1031 (“Today, most states still permit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by private and governmental
actors.”).
168. See Jacquelyn Cooper, Modern Day Segregation: States Fighting to Legally Allow Businesses To Refuse Service to Same-Sex Couples Under the
Shield of the First Amendment, 15 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 413, 414 (2014)
(“Over half a dozen states have introduced bills that would allow businesses,
religious organizations, and even public servants to not recognize same-sex
marriage and, as a result, discriminate against gay individuals.”).
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Social conservatives have focused their anti-gay efforts primari169
ly at the state, not the federal, level. Many states do not have
meaningful gay rights organizations in place to either make the
affirmative case for gay equality or to defend themselves
170
against anti-gay legal campaigns.
3. Local Discrimination
Many local governments actively target gay people for discrimination. Local governments regularly permit or require
discrimination against gay police officers, firefighters, and city
clerks. Local school districts routinely discriminate against
171
teachers and school administrators. Local discrimination often finds voice in ballot initiatives—often spearheaded by politically powerful religious groups—to excise sexual orientation
172
from local nondiscrimination ordinances. The voters of Cincinnati, for example, amended that city’s charter to excise the
LGBT community from the city’s antidiscrimination ordinances
173
and to preclude restoring any protected status. Some cities
use their zoning power to deny gay and gay-friendly establish174
ments necessary licenses to operate. Indeed, some local officials have declared their cities to be “straight town[s]” where
175
gay people are not welcome. Gays do not have political power
in areas where the electorate views itself as religiously opposed

169. See AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX 113–14 (2012).
170. See generally id. (noting how absence of state organizations proves
detrimental to gay equality).
171. See, e.g., Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs., 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008).
Many state laws also discriminate against gay students. For example, “in nine
states, school officials are statutorily prohibited from providing LGBT students with the information, advice, or acknowledgement necessary to support
this vulnerable student population.” Jillian Lenson, Litigation Primer Attacking State “No Promo Homo” Laws: Why “Don’t Say Gay” Is Not O.K., 24 TUL.
J.L. & SEXUALITY 145, 146–47 (2015); see also id. at 147 (“These laws convey
an unambiguous message that homosexuality is so immoral that even its very
existence must be denied.”).
172. See STONE, supra note 169, at 8 (“And in a survey of local nondiscrimination ordinances from 1972 to 1993, more than one out of three passed ordinances that include sexual orientation was challenged in efforts to overturn it.
If anything, this data suggests an underestimation of attempted anti-gay direct legislation.”).
173. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289, 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
174. Luke A. Boso, Urban Bias, Rural Sexual Minorities, and the Courts,
60 UCLA L. REV. 562, 584 (2013).
175. Id. at 584 n.117 (2013) (discussing the proclamation of Gulfport, Mississippi councilman Billy Hewes).
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to homosexuality, and gays are unlikely to avoid discrimination
176
in such regions in the short term without judicial protection.
B. THE REGIONAL VARIATION OF POLITICAL POWER OF GAY
AMERICANS
Making accurate, sweeping generalizations about the political power of gay Americans nationwide is difficult. The legal
treatment of gay Americans varies wildly across states. Legislatures in some states have acted to protect their gay citizens
from discrimination, while others have endorsed discrimination. Voters in statewide initiatives have generally opposed
equality for their gay brethren, but exceptions exist when voters have supported gay rights.
1. Comparisons of Gay Political Power Across States
Some states may be characterized as gay protective. In
mid-twentieth century America, states were relatively equal in
their mistreatment of—and their failure to protect—gay people.
Beginning in 1961, however, differences began to emerge. In
that year, Illinois repealed its sodomy law. Eventually other
states followed suit until by the mid-1980s, half of the states
had eliminated their sodomy laws through either legislative repeal or judicial invalidation. Beyond ceasing the criminalization of sexual orientation, states in the 1980s began affirmatively protecting gay people from discrimination. Beginning in
Wisconsin in 1982, several states have included sexual orienta177
tion in their statewide antidiscrimination laws. Some gayprotective states include sexual orientation in their hate-crimes
178
statutes. During the national debate over same-sex marriage,
most states legalized same-sex marriage through judicial action, but a few states achieved marriage equality through legislative votes or statewide referenda. These are indicia of political power.

176. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 445 (Conn.
2008) (“Feelings and beliefs predicated on such profound religious and moral
principles are likely to be enduring, and persons and groups adhering to those
views undoubtedly will continue to exert influence over public policy makers.”).
177. Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding
the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 286 (1994).
178. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2008); In re Joshua H.,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 293 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993) (upholding California’s hate crime statute that included sexual orientation).
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California stands as an example of a state whose legislature has moved to protect its gay citizens on a variety of fronts.
By statute, California bans discrimination based on sexual ori179
180
181
entation in health care plans, insurance, housing, em182
183
184
ployment, jury service, and education. More broadly, California’s Unruh Act ensures that, regardless of sexual
orientation, all persons “are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in
185
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” California has also been at the forefront in gay-protective legislation, being the first state to enact laws requiring the teaching
of gay history in public schools and prohibiting anti-gay reparative therapy. These legislative victories suggest that gay Cali186
fornians possess a modicum of political power.
In contrast to gay-protective states, such as California, gay
people clearly lack political power in the many states that have
been affirmatively hostile to gay rights. Gays are essentially
politically powerless in states whose sodomy laws were invali187
dated only by Lawrence v. Texas. After all, gay people in the

179. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5(a) (West 2016) (“No health care
service plan or specialized health care service plan shall refuse to enter into
any contract or shall cancel or decline to renew or reinstate any contract because of . . . sexual orientation . . . .”).
180. CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(a) (West 2013) (“[S]exual orientation shall not,
of itself, constitute a condition or risk for which a higher rate, premium, or
charge may be required of the insured for that insurance.”).
181. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 (West 2011).
182. Id. § 12940.
183. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231.5 (West 2006).
184. ROBERT D. LINKS, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION § 11:6 (West 2016) (“The prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination in the Education Code was accomplished by the insertion of the phrase
‘or any basis that is contained in the prohibition of hate crimes set forth in
subdivision (a) of Section 422.6 of the Penal Code’ into [the Education Code].”).
185. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2016).
186. Yet, even protective states remain problematic. In California, after the
state’s supreme court held that denying same-sex couples the right to marry
violated the California Constitution, the voters overturned the decision by
amending the state constitution with Proposition 8, which precluded same-sex
marriages. A federal judge struck down Proposition 8 as unconstitutional under heightened scrutiny. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
995 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff ’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.
2012).
187. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Several states, including Texas, took great efforts
to defend their sodomy laws against invalidation, often through procedural
manipulations. Christopher R. Leslie, Procedural Rules or Procedural Pretexts?: A Case Study of Procedural Hurdles in Constitutional Challenges to the
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thirteen states that continued to criminalize homosexuality until Lawrence had insufficient political power to prevent themselves from being labeled as felons and thus subject to employment discrimination, having their children taken away in
188
custody disputes, and other collateral consequences. Still today, approximately half of the states do not include sexual ori189
entation in their statewide nondiscrimination laws; this
makes it legal for employers, landlords, and retailers to discriminate against gay people, potentially rendering gay people
jobless, homeless, and unable to shop in stores or eat in restau190
rants. In most states, these are not innocent omissions; indeed, several states have tried or proposed to prevent any city
within the state from including sexual orientation in its local
191
nondiscrimination ordinance. Moreover, the multitude of anti-gay state laws are all evidence that the gay people targeted
192
by these laws lack political power.
The political powerlessness of gays is also demonstrated by
states trying to silence gay people. By making it legal to discriminate based on sexual orientation, states attempt to force
gay people into the closet in order to prevent them from exercising power. In the 1980s, Oklahoma defended the constitutionality of its law that provided for the termination of teachers who
advocated “private homosexual activity,” which meant that “[a]
teacher who went before the Oklahoma legislature or appeared
on television to urge the repeal of the Oklahoma anti-sodomy
statute” could be fired for exercising his or her free speech
193
rights. The Tenth Circuit struck down the law as violating

Texas Sodomy Law, 89 KY. L.J. 1109, 1149 (2001); see also Christopher R.
Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing Doctrine To
Insulate Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 29, 40–
44 (arguing that state courts have invoked federal standing doctrine to argue
that because sodomy laws are not enforced, there is no injury).
188. Leslie, supra note 141, at 137–68 (describing examples of employment
discrimination, custody discrimination, discrimination against gay organizations, discriminatory enforcement of solicitation statutes, and immigration
discrimination against homosexuals).
189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
190. Even in states without statewide protection, gays may have protection
against discrimination in cities with local nondiscrimination ordinances that
include sexual orientation, though some states have tried to nullify such local
protections. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
191. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 197–99, 211–14 and accompanying text.
193. Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270,
1274 (10th Cir. 1984), aff ’d, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
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194

the First Amendment, a decision upheld by an equally divid195
ed Supreme Court. Today, nine states continue to try to prevent students from knowing that gay people can be well196
adjusted and happy; these states have enacted so-called “No
Promo Homo” laws, which forbid school teachers from discussing homosexuality except as a mechanism for transmitting dis197
eases. For example, Texas law provides that “[c]ourse materials and instruction relating to sexual education or sexually
transmitted diseases should include: . . . (8) emphasis . . . that
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public
and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under Sec198
tion 21.06, Penal Code.” The law still exists more than a decade after the Supreme Court held section 21.06 unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas. Texas is not exceptional in this
199
regard.
The fact that so many unconstitutional laws, such as Oklahoma’s anti-speech law, are enacted to discriminate against
gays also shows an absence of political power. Most notably, the
Supreme Court has struck down state sodomy laws and state
same-sex marriage bans. These decisions followed from the first
Supreme Court decision to strike down an anti-gay state law,
200
Romer v. Evans, which invalidated Colorado’s amendment 2.
Lower federal courts have invalidated anti-gay state laws, generally on grounds unrelated to equal protection. For example,
194. Id.
195. Nat’l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. at 903.
196. Lenson, supra note 171, at 147 (listing Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah as
having “No Promo Homo” or “Don’t Say Gay” laws); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1359 (2000)
(suggesting that public education is a common locus of no promo homo policies).
197. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5) (2014) (“The program of instruction provided for in this section may not include a discussion of alternate
sexual lifestyles from heterosexual relationships including, but not limited to,
homosexual relationships except in the context of instruction concerning sexually transmitted diseases.”).
198. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 163.002 (West 1991).
199. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (1992) (“Course materials and instruction that relate to sexual education or sexually transmitted diseases should
include all of the following elements: . . . (8) An emphasis, in a factual manner
and from a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under the laws of the state.”).
200. See supra notes 35, 109, and accompanying text.
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Alabama enacted a law that forbade the use of public funds by
any college or university to recognize or support any group that
“promote[d] a lifestyle or actions prohibited by the sodomy and
sexual misconduct laws,” which effectively denied funds (and
on-campus banking privileges) to student gay rights organiza201
tions. The Eleventh Circuit held that the law violated the
202
First Amendment. State courts, too, have invalidated antigay state laws. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court
struck down a child welfare regulation that provided that “[n]o
person may serve as a foster parent if any adult member of that
person’s household is a homosexual” as violating the separation
203
of powers doctrine. These anti-gay laws illustrate both the
inability of gays to protect themselves in the political process
and the need for judicial scrutiny.
Some judges have suggested that these judicial victories
are evidence of the political power of gay Americans. For example, in holding that gay people have too much political power to
qualify for heightened scrutiny, the Maryland Court of Appeals
reasoned, in part, that “judicial trends toward reversing various forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation under204
score an increasing political coming of age.” The court is mistaken; judicial invalidation of unconstitutional laws does not
demonstrate political power. Courts are—at least theoretically—not political. The fact that the federal and state governments are passing unconstitutional anti-gay laws and that gay
people consistently need judicial protection to invalidate these
201. Gay Lesbian Bisexual All. v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir.
1997) (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-28 (1995)).
202. Id. at 1550.
203. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1, 3, 8 (Ark. 2006)
(quoting Ark. Reg. § 200.3.2 (Jan. 1999)).
204. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 613 (Md. 2007), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
The Maryland Supreme Court implied that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Romer v. Evans, in which the court struck down amendment 2, demonstrated that gays had political power. Id. at 612–13 (discussing Romer and Lawrence, and indicating that “[e]volutionary legal developments highlighting
changing views toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons are not
limited to statutory and regulatory enactments”).
Courts should not be using Romer as evidence that gays have political
power. The episode behind Romer shows the utter lack of political power that
gay people had in Colorado in the early 1990s. The fact that the court system
protected gays from unconstitutional discrimination is not evidence of political
power; rather, it should be evidence that the political process failed to protect
gays from discrimination, which is an argument in favor of heightened scrutiny for gay citizens.
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discriminatory laws is stronger evidence of the lack of political
power that gay Americans endure.
In some states, gays are constantly under attack from antigay legislators. Oklahoma stands as an example. In the first
month of 2016 alone, Oklahoma legislators introduced at least
twenty-six anti-LGBT bills, including proposed laws that would
allow businesses to discriminate against gay individuals and
gay couples, would allow adoption agencies to refuse service to
gay people, would deter gay students from talking to school
counselors by requiring outing such students to their (potentially homophobic) parents, would prevent municipalities in
Oklahoma from passing gay-inclusive nondiscrimination laws,
and would specifically allow conversion therapy against gay
youth, including “physical pain, such as electroshock or electroconvulsive therapy, touch therapy, pornography exposure or
vomit-induction therapy, in order to . . . eliminate or reduce
sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward individuals of
205
the same sex.”
Some might interpret the eventual failure of some anti-gay
proposals to become law as proof of gay political power. It is
not. Even successes at the ballot box or state legislatures in defeating proposed anti-gay laws are not necessarily evidence of
political power because gay Americans are largely playing defense. Politically powerful opponents of basic equality constantly force gay Americans to spend their time, energy, and resources to defend themselves against anti-gay legislative
proposals and initiatives. Indeed, this is the strategy of equality opponents: distract gay people and their allies and force
them to play defense so that they have insufficient resources to
206
make affirmative gains towards equality. For example, “an
anti-gay campaign industry developed . . . in Oregon, ‘where
the drafting, circulation, and qualification of antigay initiatives

205. Mark Joseph Stern, The Latest Anti-Gay Oklahoma Bills Are Almost
Too Crazy To Believe, SLATE: OUTWARD (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/outward/2016/01/28/oklahoma_anti_gay_bills_on_conversion_therapy_
and_blood_testing_are_crazy.html (quoting the forms of aversion therapy that
a proposed law would protect from legal challenge); see also Zack Ford, Oklahoma Sets New Record for Attempts To Discriminate Against LGBT People,
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 28, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/oklahoma-sets-new
-record-for-attempts-to-discriminate-against-lgbt-people-8f24d927bbe2#
.3qskwmkkr (listing dozens of proposed anti-gay laws in Oklahoma).
206. See STONE, supra note 169, at 6 (summarizing Religious Right tactics
such as changing the type, subject, and jurisdiction of anti-gay referendums
and initiatives).
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became something of a cottage industry.’ Through the coordinated efforts of one group, the Religious Right can flood LGBT
communities with anti-gay ballot initiatives, depleting re207
sources and dividing group efforts.” When gay rights groups
had to defend against statewide DOMA initiatives, they could
not effectively lobby for nondiscrimination protections or hate208
crimes legislation. In many of these battles over gay rights, a
“win” does not advance gay rights; it merely preserves a status
209
quo that is often unfavorable to gay equality. Resources are
also diverted from other activities to make life better for gay
people in hostile areas. In short, opponents of civil rights win
even if appears that they lose because their goal was to distract
and divert, not to necessarily achieve a majority of votes.
In sum, this brief sketch demonstrates that gays can have
political power in some states, but not others.
2. Regional Variations of Political Power Within States
In addition to inter-state differences regarding the political
power of gays, intra-state differences also exist. In many states,
some cities have enacted gay-inclusive nondiscrimination ordinances. This creates asymmetries within states, especially in
those without statewide nondiscrimination laws that include
sexual orientation. In small conservative towns, officials are
more likely to commit, than to guard against, anti-gay discrim210
ination. Gay people in rural areas are often particularly in
211
need of legal protections. Consequently, rural gays are often
politically powerless and badly need heightened scrutiny to
212
preserve their rights. The asymmetry of legal protections can

207. Id. at 10 (quoting Todd Donovan et al., Direct Democracy and Gay
Rights Initiatives After Romer, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 165 (Craig A.
Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000).
208. Id. at 135.
209. See id. at 44.
210. Boso, supra note 174, at 601–02 (“[W]here local and state politicians
represent predominately conservative, older, and blue-collar constituencies,
and where progay groups spend little time and resources . . . local lawmakers
are not likely to combat antigay discrimination independently . . . .”).
211. Id. at 566 (“Sexual minorities are uniquely vulnerable in many small
towns and rural areas. Social discrimination and limited economic opportunities can leave them restricted in their ability to live freely and comfortably in
their homes, and many predominately rural places lack even basic legal protections from discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
212. See id. at 602 (“For rural sexual minorities, then, courts often provide
the most realistic and affordable avenue for vindicating rights.”).
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compel many gay people to move from relatively hostile cities to
213
more protective—or at least less discriminatory—cities.
Some states have considered eliminating these intra-state
variations by affirmatively denying nondiscrimination protections to gays statewide. Gay-hostile states not only refuse to
protect gay people; many have tried to prevent all cities within
their state from including sexual orientation in local nondiscrimination ordinances. For example, in response to Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver adopting gay-inclusive nondiscrimination
laws, Colorado voters passed amendment 2, which would have
prevented any discrimination claim based on sexual orientation
anywhere in the state. After the Supreme Court struck down
amendment 2 for singling out gay people for non-protection,
several states have proposed more facially neutral schemes to
achieve a similar result to amendment 2. In Arkansas and
Tennessee, legislators enacted state laws that preclude municipalities from protecting any groups not included in statewide
214
nondiscrimination laws. Because these states refuse to protect gay people from discrimination, these laws prevent localities from doing so as well and essentially nullify any political
power enjoyed by gays at a local level.
In sum, whether gay Americans have political power depends on where they reside. Gays in California may possess
some meaningful political power while gays in Oklahoma do
not. Gays in Austin may possess political power even though
Texas does not have a statewide gay-inclusive nondiscrimination law. In contrast, gays in Fayetteville, Arkansas may not
have meaningful political power because even though the city is
Judicial recourse is critical in these jurisdictions because, as Professor
Doug NeJaime explains, “[c]ourts generally have an obligation to hear and
consider a group’s grievance, even when lawmakers do not provide a forum.
And because courts enjoy some degree of independence, they may advance the
group’s cause even when political actors and the general public remain relatively hostile.” Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY
L.J. 663, 665 (2012).
213. See, e.g., Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 151, at 958 (arguing that
some cities use their powers to improve the lives of gay and lesbian residents).
214. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-1-403(a) (West 2015) (“A county, municipality,
or other political subdivision of the state shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.”); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 7-51-1802(a)(1) (West 2016) (“No local government shall by ordinance,
resolution, or any other means impose on or make applicable to any person an
anti-discrimination practice, standard, definition, or provision that shall deviate from, modify, supplement, add to, change, or vary in any manner from
[state law].”).
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gay-friendly, the state legislature has forbidden all Arkansas
cities from protecting their gay residents and visitors against
discrimination. Political power is, in effect, a function of geography.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
JURISPRUDENCE
When courts discuss whether a group seeking heightened
scrutiny possesses political power, they tend to make sweeping
pronouncements, untethered to geography. This Part shows
that the answer to the question of whether a group is politically
powerless depends on where you look. And courts often look in
the wrong place.
A. FEDERAL LAW, STATE/LOCAL LENS
In cases involving equal protection challenges to federal
laws, courts invoke examples of gay legislative victories at the
state and local level in order to deny heightened scrutiny and to
uphold anti-gay laws under rational basis review. For example,
in 1989, the Seventh Circuit upheld the U.S. Army’s policy of
215
disqualifying gay men and lesbians from military service. In
reversing a lower court’s decision to apply heightened scrutiny,
the appellate court held that sexual orientation did not constitute a suspect classification, in part, because “[h]omosexuals
216
are not without political power.” The court came to this conclusion based on three data points: “one congressman is an
avowed homosexual, and . . . there is a charge that five other
top officials are known to be homosexual,” and “the Mayor of
217
Chicago participated in a gay rights parade.” Yet, the Seventh Circuit is not the only court to conclude that a single
mayor’s participation in a gay rights parade means that gays
have nationwide political power relevant to political control
218
over military policy. Given that the anti-gay policy at issue is
federal, mayoral support for civil rights is immaterial.

215. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
216. Id. at 466 n.9.
217. Id.
218. See Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 1991) (“It is beyond
doubt that the homosexual community has been able to reach out and gain the
attention of politicians of all sorts. One need only remember St. Patrick’s Day
1991 in New York City to see Mayor David Dinkins marching in the traditionally Irish-Catholic parade with homosexual groups and activists who were important supporters during his tough mayoral campaign.”), rev’d sub nom.
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Other courts have followed the same approach of denying
heightened scrutiny—based on isolated state and local examples of gay political power—and then upholding federal anti219
gay policies under rational basis review. Perhaps most notably, the Ninth Circuit in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial
220
Security Clearance Office considered an equal protection challenge to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) long-maintained
policy of requiring expanded investigations of all gay applicants
for Secret and Top Secret clearances. This policy effectively
precluded gay men and lesbians from working in both governmental and private positions that required security clearanc221
es. The Ninth Circuit refused to apply heightened scrutiny
222
because gay Americans “are not without political power.” To
support its conclusion, the court noted that Wisconsin barred
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
that California has barred violence against persons or property
based on sexual orientation, that Michigan has barred the denial of care in health facilities on the basis of sexual orientation, that New York had an executive order prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination, and that nine cities included sexual
223
orientation in nondiscrimination ordinances. Relying on these
atypical state-based instances of nondiscrimination, the court
applied rational basis review and upheld the DoD’s anti-gay
224
The court never attempted to explain how gaypolicy.
inclusive laws in a few states translated into gays having political power vis-à-vis Congress or the DoD.
This judicial invocation of non-federal examples of gay political power in cases challenging federal laws is inappropriate
and misleading. In a different Ninth Circuit challenge to the
Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff ’d sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
219. See, e.g., id. at 8 n.15 (upholding the military’s anti-gay policy after
denying heightened scrutiny, in part, because several cities “have passed antidiscrimination regulations concerning homosexuals” and “California, Michigan, New York and Wisconsin all have various statewide legislation or regulations which benefit homosexual groups”).
220. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by SmithKline Beecham Corp.
v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
221. Id. at 569 n.5.
222. Id. at 574.
223. Id. at 574 n.10. The court also asserted that, based on Bowers, “because homosexual conduct can . . . be criminalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis review for equal protection purposes.” Id. at 571.
224. Id. at 580–81.
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military gay-exclusion policy, the Army argued that gay people
“cannot be politically powerless because two states, Wisconsin
and California, have passed statutes prohibiting discrimination
225
Although the majority avoided the
against homosexuals.”
equal protection issues by deciding the case on estoppel principles, Judge Norris, in concurrence, explained the folly of the
Army’s position: “Two state statutes do not overcome the long
and extensive history of laws discriminating against homosexuals in all fifty states. Moreover, at the national level—the relevant political level for seeking protection from military discrimination—homosexuals have been wholly unsuccessful in
getting legislation passed that protects them from discrimina226
tion.” In other words, the courts in these cases are using the
wrong lens; it matters little if some states provide protection to
gay Americans when the policy being challenged is federal and
gay Americans do not have political power at the federal level.
Despite employing the wrong lens, cases like High Tech
Gays have proven instrumental in upholding a litany of antigay laws. Subsequent courts have relied on High Tech Gays for
the proposition that gays have political power and, therefore,
227
are not entitled to heightened scrutiny. More importantly,
over a dozen judicial opinions have relied on High Tech Gays to
deny heightened scrutiny to gay people and to uphold anti-gay
228
policies to fire government attorneys, to terminate foreign
229
service officers, to deny to security clearances to private em230
231
to uphold DADT,
to uphold
ployees requiring them,
232
233
DOMA, to uphold sodomy laws, and to uphold state same-

225. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 n.30 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Norris, J., concurring).
226. Id. (citation omitted).
227. See, e.g., Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (E.D.
Cal. 1993).
228. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 1995), reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996), aff ’d en banc,
114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
229. See U.S. Info. Agency v. K.R.C., Civ. A. No. 87–1740(CRR), 1991 WL
166683, at *2 n.6 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 1991), aff ’d, 989 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
230. See Dubbs v. CIA, 769 F. Supp. 1113, 1116–17 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
231. See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir.
1997).
232. See Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 875, 880 (C.D. Cal.
2005), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006).
233. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 353–54, 354 n.8 (Tex. App.
2001), rev’d, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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234

sex marriage bans —in states never mentioned in High Tech
Gays. None of these federal or state anti-gay laws involved laws
from the states in which the Ninth Circuit found gays to have
political power. And yet, these courts held that because gays
enjoyed political power in a very few states, sexual orientation
is not a suspect classification in any state or when challenging
any federal law. As a result, because gay people in a handful of
states and two handfuls of cities received some measure of protection from irrational discrimination, courts treated all gay
people as having political power over the federal government,
including the armed services, and in states and localities that
are decidedly anti-gay.
Defenders of anti-gay federal laws continue to highlight
atypical examples of states protecting their gay citizens. Congress notably employed this strategy when defending DOMA.
After President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder determined that DOMA was unconstitutional and declined to defend its constitutionality, some members of the House of Representatives created the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
235
(BLAG) to defend DOMA in court. BLAG argued that gay
Americans possess political power, that heightened scrutiny is
therefore inapplicable, and that DOMA can survive rational
basis review. To make its case, BLAG emphasized that a handful of state legislatures had voted to recognize same-sex marriages and more states had granted same-sex couples most of
236
the rights associated with marriage. BLAG argued that gay
“[p]laintiffs cannot maintain that they are part of a class that
faces ‘discrimination [that] is unlikely to be soon rectified by
237
legislative means.’” This assertion is curious given that the
discrimination at issue was DOMA. How exactly would marriage discrimination “soon [be] rectified by legislative means”
when the members of BLAG had committed themselves to en-

234. See, e.g., Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1099 (D. Haw.
2012), vacated and remanded, 585 F. App’x 413 (9th Cir. 2014); Conaway v.
Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015).
235. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
236. Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor-Defendant’s Opposition
to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 18–19, Windsor, 833 F. Supp.
2d 394 (No. 10-CV-8435) [hereinafter BLAG Brief ]. BLAG also noted that several states had same-sex marriage as a result of judicial rulings. This is not an
indication of political power.
237. Id. at 12 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985)).
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suring that DOMA would be neither repealed nor invalidat238
ed? One federal judge noted that these arguments were unpersuasive in light of the fact that “since 1990 anti-gay marriage statutes or constitutional amendments have been passed
239
by 41 states and are continuing to be proposed and passed.” A
far better indicator of the relevant political power of gays was
DOMA itself, a federal law designed to discriminate against
gay couples and one that illustrates the political powerlessness
240
of gays nationally.
B. STATE LAW, A DIFFERENT STATE’S LENS
In challenges to anti-gay state laws, courts emphasize that
other states—besides the one whose law is alleged to violate
equal protection guarantees—have protected gay rights. For
example, a court considering Nevada’s ban on same-sex marriage held that “homosexuals have meaningful political power
to protect their interests,” because “homosexuals recently prevailed during the 2012 general elections on same-sex marriage
ballot measures in the States of Maine, Maryland, and Washington, and they prevailed against a fourth ballot measure that
would have prohibited same sex marriage under the Minnesota
241
Constitution.” From these four data points, the court sweep238. BLAG accused the DOMA challengers of being “oblivious to the irony
of maintaining that homosexuals have limited political power” when the DOJ
supported their position. Id. at 12–13.
Yet BLAG was equally oblivious to the irony of arguing that gays have
abundant political power when the congresspeople behind BLAG had a passed
a federal law to require discrimination against gay couples, had passed special
legislation and spent millions of dollars to defend this discriminatory law, and
were actively arguing that same-sex couples were not entitled to equal protection under the law. That Congress had affirmatively taken all of these actions
to hurt gay Americans is proof positive that gays lack political power at the
federal level.
BLAG noted that Obama had nominated a handful of openly gay judges
(one of whom was recently confirmed), that corporate America was more supportive of gay rights, and that gay candidates were winning state and local
elections. Id. at 13–17. But BLAG did not explain how any of these translated
into political power vis-à-vis Congress.
239. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331 (D. Conn.
2012).
240. See Rush, supra note 45, at 722–23 (“Indeed, one logically could conclude that passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), defining marriage
as between a man and a woman, and the efforts of many states to pass laws
limiting marriage to a man and a woman, are the ultimate evidence of just
how politically powerless gays are throughout the country,” (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted)).
241. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1013 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d
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ingly rejected the claim that “homosexuals do not have the ability to protect themselves from discrimination through democratic processes such that extraordinary protection from ma242
The court never
joritarian processes is appropriate.”
explained why these four hard-fought state victories (in generally gay-supportive states) proved that gays have political power in Nevada, let alone nationwide.
In addition to looking in the wrong state, courts misinterpret the evidence that they find in other states. For example, a
Texas appellate court upheld that state’s ban on same-sex marriage under rational basis after concluding that gay people are
243
not a “politically powerless minority.” The court’s sole support
was the fact that forty-six percent of Colorado voters opposed
amendment 2 and over forty-seven percent of California voters
244
opposed a referendum banning same-sex marriages. In both
of these non-Texas examples, voters adopted explicitly anti-gay
245
laws. It is almost nonsensical that political losses in Colorado
and California are evidence that gays possess political power in
Texas.
Courts analyzing the political power factor in cases involving challenges to anti-gay state laws have also sometimes used
a national lens. For example, a district court in Nevada upheld
that state’s ban on same-sex marriage under rational basis review after holding that the gay plaintiffs were not entitled to
heightened scrutiny because gays were not politically power246
less. After noting that President Obama had announced his
support for marriage equality and had directed the Attorney
General not to defend DOMA in court, the judge concluded that
the fact “[t]hat the homosexual-rights lobby has achieved this
247
indicates that the group has great political power.” It is intersub nom. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
242. Id.
243. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 673 (Tex. App. 2010).
244. Id.
245. For more information on amendment 2, see Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994). For more information on California’s referendum, see
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
246. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
247. Id. While the court sees this evidence of political power, the DOJ’s decision to not defend DOMA was more likely driven by its lawyers’ independent
determination that DOMA was, in fact, unconstitutional. See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 330 (D. Conn. 2012) (“This Court
agrees that BLAG’s ‘contention that a two-year-old letter from a gay rights
advocacy group was the pivotal consideration in the Administration’s reas-
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esting that the court emphasized the current president’s opposition to DOMA while ignoring the significance of Congress enacting an anti-gay law specifically designed to harm gay fami248
lies. The court noted that Congress has refused to included
sexual orientation “under Title VII’s protections,” but gave this
no weight because it concluded that the political power factor
249
“weighs greatly in favor of rational basis review.”
Some state courts hearing challenges to anti-gay state laws
and evaluating whether gay people lack political power have, in
fact, used the proper state lens. In these cases, different courts
have reached different conclusions. Some state supreme courts
have found that gay people lack political power within the state
250
and are entitled to heightened scrutiny. In contrast, other
state supreme courts have found that gay people possess politi251
cal power in the state. This demonstrates the legal significance of regional variations in political power.
sessment of the law or that it demonstrates that gay men and lesbians have
political power is speculative at best.’” (quoting Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012))).
248. Furthermore, presidential preferences are an inappropriate measure
of a group’s political power for several reasons. First, while President Obama’s
endorsement of equality is welcomed, the views of the President are largely
irrelevant to how the lives of gay Americans are lived and how their rights are
denied. Second, presidential preferences do not necessarily translate into policy. Prior to President Obama, the president most supportive of gay rights was
President Clinton, who campaigned in 1992 on his commitment to equal rights
for gay Americans. His personal commitment to nondiscrimination did not
prevent him from signing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the mislabeled Defense
of Marriage Act, the two major pieces of gay-related legislation enacted during
the Clinton era, both which codified discrimination against gay
servicemembers and same-sex couples, respectively. Third, this measure is too
ephemeral. Obama’s Republican challenger in 2012 was Mitt Romney, a decidedly anti-gay candidate. If Romney had won, would gays then be considered
politically powerless for equal protection purposes? The determination of political power cannot turn on quadrennial elections.
249. Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
250. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 447 n.42
(Conn. 2008) (“Although we recognize that Connecticut is a leader in terms of
the number of openly gay and lesbian lawmakers elected to the legislature, we
view that fact as indicative of the political weakness of gay persons nationwide, and not as indicative of the political strength of gay persons in this
state.”).
251. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 467 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[G]ays and lesbians in this state
currently lack the insularity, unpopularity, and consequent political vulnerability upon which the notion of suspect classifications is founded.” (emphasis
added)), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5;
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 53 (Haw. 1993) (noting, but rejecting, the lower
court’s factual finding that “homosexuals in Hawaii have not been relegated to
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C. THE PURPOSE OF THE POLITICAL POWER FACTOR AND WHY
THE CORRECT LENS MATTERS
As explained in Part II, the purpose of the political power
factor is to determine whether the political process has failed to
protect a minority from mistreatment. When the political process targets a minority for discrimination, courts employ
heightened scrutiny to ensure that the challenged law is not
252
the product of prejudice. This seems straightforward, but the
language of the political power factor lends itself to misinterpretation because it speaks in the singular of “the” political
process as if only one political process existed. For example, the
Supreme Court has noted the need for heightened scrutiny
when minorities “are relatively powerless to protect their inter253
ests in the political process.” State courts, too, refer to “the political process” as though one political machine controlled the
whole country.
The American political system, however, is composed of literally thousands of political processes. Every state, county, city,
and school board has its own political process. The federal government, too, has multiple political processes given that—in
addition to Congress—the regulatory agencies and military
branches have significant autonomy in developing policies. To
determine whether an anti-gay law is the result of a prejudicial, failed political process, one must first determine which political process is relevant.
Courts err when they look at any political process instead
of examining the political process that created the challenged
law. Gays have no voice in many of the political processes in
the United States. Indeed, many political processes are decidedly anti-gay. If the purpose of the political power factor is to
determine whether a challenged law is the product of prejudice,
then the relevant political process is the one that created the
law. Thus, when Congress enacts anti-gay laws, such as DOMA
a position of ‘political powerlessness.’ . . . [T]here is no evidence that homosexuals and the homosexual legislative agenda have failed to gain legislative support in Hawaii” (quoting the circuit court’s evidentiary findings)), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d
963, 974–75 (Wash. 2006) (“The enactment of provisions providing increased
protections to gay and lesbian individuals in Washington shows that as a class
gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but, instead, exercise increasing political power.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
252. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
253. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973)
(emphasis added).
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or DADT, the relevant inquiry is whether gay Americans have
political power in Congress. Federal courts evaluating anti-gay
federal laws should not look at state progress when determining whether or not gays are politically powerless. State-based
analysis provides no evidence as to whether the federal political
process has failed in a manner that warrants heightened scrutiny of federal laws that target gay Americans. In other words,
did the political process that created the challenged law fail?
Was this process tainted by prejudice?
Similarly, state courts err when they look to out-of-state
examples of gay political victories in order to hold that gays
have political power more broadly. Equal protection claims
based on state constitutions, being evaluated in state courts,
should necessarily involve a state-centric view of the elements
used to determine suspect classifications. When applying equal
protection under a state constitution, the court is determining
only whether laws targeting gays are suspect in that state.
This, in turn, should be a function of whether gays are politically powerless in that state. That gays have a modicum of political power in Maine is irrelevant to whether sexual orientation
is a suspect classification in Alabama. The inquiry for equal
protection purposes should not focus on gay people in other
states who are unaffected by the discriminatory law. Rather,
the inquiry should ask whether those gay people targeted by
the discriminatory law are politically powerless.
When courts can look outside of the relevant political process for evidence of political power, it exacerbates the problem
of cherry-picking. Using isolated examples of local successes to
generalize about national political power results in false ex254
trapolations. Yet judges and attorneys do this often when asserting that gay Americans possess too much political power to
qualify for suspect classification. For example, in arguing that
gays had political power, BLAG emphasized the fact that California had enacted a law that required the state’s “public school
textbooks to include historical contribution[s] of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgendered (‘LGBT’) Americans,” but ignored

254. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d
623 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The Ninth Circuit’s position in High Tech Gays not only
exaggerates the significance of recent anti-discrimination efforts, it suffers
from a more fundamental error. It mistakenly assumes that scattered, piecemeal successes in local legislation are proof of political power, and hence an
invalidation of the use of heightened scrutiny in governmental classifications
based on sexual orientation.”).
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the fact that no other state had a similar law and many states
had proposed or maintained laws that forbid any discussion of
255
homosexuality in public schools. More importantly, given the
case’s influence in denying heightened scrutiny of anti-gay
256
laws, the High Tech Gays court picked atypical examples to
support its sweeping assertions about the political power of gay
257
Americans. Noting that the Ninth Circuit had cited “antidiscrimination provisions in three states, an executive order in
New York, and a series of local ordinances,” a federal judge in
Kansas explained that High Tech Gays court had presented “an
inaccurate, and exaggerated, view of recent state anti258
discrimination legislation.” The Kansas judge noted that the
Ninth Circuit’s source, a special edition of the Harvard Law
Review, “conclude[d] that discrimination against homosexuals
is pervasive, and recent changes in the law too inadequate to
259
provide adequate protection.” The Ninth Circuit erred by
looking at individual victories to infer a pattern of political
power. The court also failed to appreciate that the exception
proves the rule: the fact that these successes stand out shows
260
that they are, in fact, exceptional.
V. MOVING FORWARD
Part IV explained how, in equal protection cases challenging anti-gay laws, a disconnect exists between the source of the
anti-gay law and where courts look for evidence to determine
255. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 330–31 (D.
Conn. 2012).
256. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 n.30 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); BLAG Brief, supra note 236, at 18–19.
258. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1549.
259. Id. at 1550. This case also illustrates how courts engaging in cherrypicking often overemphasize examples of gay victories while simultaneously
disregarding evidence of anti-gay prejudice animating anti-gay laws. For example, after Colorado’s vote passed Amendment Two, a federal judge—
considering an Equal Protection challenge to the Navy’s anti-gay policy—
discounted this by asserting that “evidence that one state has enacted legislation preventing homosexuals from participating in its political process is insufficient to support the conclusion that homosexuals generally lack political
power as a class.” Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 n.9,
(E.D. Cal. 1993). It seems incongruent for judges to require gay plaintiffs to
show that gays “generally” lack political power but then have judges refute
plaintiffs’ evidence of political powerlessness with atypical examples.
260. See Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (“Moreover, an event’s newsworthiness could very well indicate that the event is aberrational or exceptional as
opposed to an ordinary or commonplace occurrence.”).
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whether gays have political power. This leads to inaccurate assessments about the political power of gay people targeted by
anti-gay laws. This disconnect also means that gay people in
gay-hostile states are essentially being penalized for the legislative victories achieved by gays in other states. This Part considers three potential judicial responses to address the geographic problems currently associated with the political power
factor.
First, one possible approach is for courts to make geographically tailored findings of political power such that the political power inquiry is tethered to the political unit that enacted the challenged law. One could argue that the test for
whether a minority group is politically powerless should focus
on whether that group has political power vis-à-vis decisionmakers who have enacted the challenged law. If the political
power factor is intended to determine whether the political process that created the discriminatory law was a product of prejudice, then it makes sense to examine that political process, not
others. Thus, in an equal protection challenge to DOMA or
DADT, courts would examine whether gays have political power vis-à-vis Congress and the President, not whether gays have
political power with respect to the state legislatures in Califor261
nia and Wisconsin. Similarly, when considering whether gays
challenging a discriminatory state law have political power,
courts would examine the political status of gays in that state,
262
not in other states.
Such an approach would increase accuracy, but would create disuniformity. Because gay people have different levels of
political power in different states, if courts apply the political
power factor in a state-specific manner, then sexual orientation
could be a suspect classification in some states but not others.
If different levels of scrutiny are applied in different states, this
could result in similar laws being valid in some states and unconstitutional in others. For example, Wisconsin was the first
state to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in
employment, housing, education, and public accommodations.
Nevertheless, following positive votes in both houses of the
Wisconsin legislature, in 2006 the Wisconsin electorate voted to
amend their state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages.

261. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 n.30.
262. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text.
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263

In Oklahoma, a relatively gay-hostile state, the legislature
and voters similarly amended their state constitution in 2004.
Suppose gay citizens of each state challenged their state’s
same-sex marriage ban as violating the 14th Amendment. It is
possible that because gay people in Wisconsin could be found to
have political power while gay people in Oklahoma could be
found not to have such power, the marriage prohibition would
receive rational basis review in Wisconsin but be subject to
heightened scrutiny in Oklahoma. The same law could survive
judicial review in Wisconsin, yet be declared unconstitutional
in Oklahoma because of the stricter scrutiny. Such lack of uni264
formity could prove unpalatable.
Some judges already appear unlikely to embrace geographically customized findings. For example, in a case challenging
D.C.’s ban on same-sex marriage, Judge Ferren explicitly observed that “for purposes of evaluating constitutional norms,
the focus on political power, or powerlessness, has to be nation265
al, not local, lest constitutional rights vary from city to city.”
While Ferren’s observation is not precedential, most judges
would probably find it persuasive.
Second, if judges are reticent to increase the accuracy of
their political power findings at the expense of uniformity,
courts could hold that if a group is politically powerless in any
part—or any significant part, however defined—of the country,
then that group should be considered politically powerless for
the purpose of the suspect classification test’s political power
factor. This approach ensures uniformity at the expense of
complete accuracy, but does so in a manner that favors the targets of discriminatory laws. So long as gays are politically powerless in several states, gays should be considered politically
266
powerless for equal protection purposes, full stop. Gay people
263. See, e.g., Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d
1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984) (striking down Oklahoma law that punished public school teachers for publicly supporting gay rights), aff ’d, 470 U.S. 903
(1985).
264. This disuniformity may be permissible for state courts applying equal
protection analysis under their state constitutions. See supra notes 37–38 and
accompanying text. Applying different levels of scrutiny, however, would create serious problems if state courts were holding their state laws were violating the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as state supreme
courts often do. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking
down California’s miscegenation law as violating the U.S. Constitution).
265. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 351 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren,
J., dissenting).
266. This approach makes sense in that race-based laws and gender-based
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currently satisfy this standard easily: most states do not include sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination laws and
267
many states enact explicitly anti-gay laws. Furthermore, gays
do not have power at the national level, as shown by Congress’s
failure to protect gay Americans from discrimination and its
frequent efforts to target gays with discriminatory laws such as
268
DOMA and DADT. Under this approach, given that gay people can satisfy the other factors of suspect classification and
lack political power in many parts of the country, sexual orientation would be considered a suspect classification and anti-gay
laws would receive heightened scrutiny everywhere.
Third, to the extent that accuracy and uniformity are inherently in tension, examining the geographic quandaries
posed by the political power factor counsels courts to abandon
the factor altogether. If using disparate levels of scrutiny across
states is deemed impractical or unacceptable but any uniform,
national assertions regarding political power would be inaccurate, then this suggests that the political power inquiry itself is
ill-conceived and ill-equipped to perform the task of determining which groups warrant heightened scrutiny. The political
power factor is largely unnecessary. The key trigger for labeling
a classification to be suspect should be that the challenged law
269
is likely the product of prejudice, not sound public policy. This
is established with the first two factors: that the group has historically been discriminated against and that the characteristic
is unrelated to the group members’ ability to contribute to soci270
ety. Once these factors are established, the political power
laws receive heightened scrutiny without any individualized findings regarding political power.
267. See supra notes 165, 167, and accompanying text.
268. See generally Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 151, at 963 (detailing the
lack of comprehensive federal protection of gays and lesbians); Powers, supra
note 100 (explaining that gays and lesbians were not proportionately represented because there were only three openly gay representatives in Congress).
269. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 n.14 (1982) (“Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications as ‘suspect.’ Some
classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. . . .
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal.”).
270. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 426–27 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (noting that these two factors are the “most meaningful”); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.
Supp. 2d 632, 652 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff ’d sub nom. De Leon v. Abbott, 791
F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding compelling the argument that “the history of
same-sex marriage bans across the nation illustrates the historical lack of political power possessed by gays and lesbians”). But see Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S.
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inquiry provides little additional insight. Political powerless272
ness may correlate with prejudice but is not a prerequisite.
Removing any explicit inquiry into a group’s political power should not fundamentally change the underlying insights of
Carolene Products because, in a sense, the political powerlessness element seems self-evident. When gay litigants are in
court challenging a law that discriminates against gay people,
it is necessarily true that gay citizens did not have sufficient
political power either to stop the law from being passed or to
ensure its imminent repeal. If gays had political power, they
would not need to seek protection from courts against discriminatory laws. Furthermore, the factors of historic discrimination
and relevance should sufficiently establish a group’s lack of political power. If a law discriminates based on a trait irrelevant
to ability, that suggests that improper bias or stereotyping has
273
infected the political process. Similarly, courts should provide
greater scrutiny to laws that discriminate against historically
discriminated-against groups because we have reason to believe
that the political process has failed those groups.

Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (“It is undisputed that homosexuals have historically been discriminated against, but this does not necessarily mean that they therefore lack political power. . . .”); see also In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.2d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008) (“Because sexual orientation,
like gender, race, or religion, is a characteristic that frequently has been the
basis for biased and improperly stereotypical treatment and that generally
bears no relation to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society,
it is appropriate for courts to evaluate with great care and with considerable
skepticism any statute that embodies such a classification.”); Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1010 (“Echoing the analysis in Kerrigan and Varnum, Eskridge
also asserts that history of discrimination and relevance of the stigmatized
trait are the only essential factors in a determination to apply heightened
scrutiny.”).
271. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 428 n.21 (Conn.
2008) (“[T]he significance of the [political powerlessness] test pales in comparison to the question[s] of whether . . . the characteristic bears any relationship
to the individual’s ability to function in society, whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination based on misconceptions of that factor and
whether that factor is the product of the group’s own volition.” (quoting Equal.
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437–
38 n.17 (S.D. Ohio 1994))).
272. See Eskridge, supra note 73, at 20 (“Political powerlessness may cast
light on the perseverance of prejudice and stereotyping that harm the minority, and it may be a prudential consideration in the U.S. Supreme Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review when applying the Equal Protection
Clause.”).
273. See Strauss, supra note 48, at 165 (“Since overt evidence of bias is difficult to ascertain, the Court uses relevance as a proxy.”).
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Many scholars have called on courts to eliminate the politi274
cal power inquiry for various reasons. The inquiry is too easy
275
to manipulate. In discussing political power, judges are some276
times results-oriented. Professor Evan Gerstmann has argued that “the judicial exercise of ostensibly evaluating whether such groups as the poor, the elderly, and gays and lesbians
meet the Court’s criteria for suspect-class status is actually a
277
charade.” Politically powerful groups receive heightened scrutiny, in part, because “the Burger Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence reflected a shift from antisubordination to
278
anticlassification.” This suggests that the Court cares more
about preventing invidious classifications than protecting the
politically powerless; yet, the political power factor remains in
place, largely to prevent the expansion of heightened scrutiny.
Thus, the Supreme Court has not afforded heightened scrutiny
279
to any new group since the 1970s. Given that many groups
have suffered a history of discrimination for immutable characteristics unrelated to their abilities—like sexual orientation—
the political power inquiry has served as a useful tool for denying heightened scrutiny to the victims of targeted discrimination. Professor Hutchinson notes, “Because the Court has usually invoked political process theory to deny judicial solicitude,
some scholars have argued that the suspect class doctrine op274. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 73, at 20 (“Consider the nature of constitutional rights, the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary, and the purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause. All point in the same direction: political powerlessness should not be a requirement for strict scrutiny.”); see also Equal.
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 860 F. Supp. at 437–38 n.17 (stating that
whether a particular group is entitled to recognition as suspect or quasisuspect class “should not be controlled by . . . a group’s ability to pass or fail
[the] . . . political power test. . . . [R]elative political power cannot even be a
particularly weighty factor, let alone a controlling one”).
275. See Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1006 (discussing how the Supreme
Court “inconsistently applies the political powerlessness factor”).
276. See GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 55 (explaining how the Justices
wanted to avoid “creat[ing] any new suspect or quasi-suspect classes”).
277. Id. at 56 (“The three-tiered framework was set up to keep new groups
out, not to let them in, and the Court has shown no inclination to add new
suspect or quasi-suspect classes. This has created an especially difficult situation for gays and lesbians.”).
278. Ross, supra note 18, at 1597 (citing Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1292 (2011) and Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003)).
279. Levy, supra note 1, at 53 (“The Court has not recognized any new suspect classifications since the 1970s . . . .”).
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erates merely as a gatekeeping mechanism, rather than as an
280
honest effort to protect politically powerless classes.” In short,
the political power inquiry often seems to be pretextual, an afterthought used to deny heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws.
Ultimately, eliminating the political power factor makes
more sense than trying to address the problem of courts looking
for political power in the wrong places. Solving the geography
problem would not solve the problems with the political power
inquiry more broadly, including the fact that courts cannot
agree on what constitutes political power and often perform
questionable analysis on the issue. For example, the district
court in Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy upheld the
military’s anti-gay policy under rational basis review by asserting that gay people were not entitled to heightened scrutiny because “[t]he recent Congressional and executive dialogue concerning homosexuals’ ability to serve in the military
demonstrates that, despite their apparent inability to assert direct control over Congress, homosexuals have a significant abil281
ity to attract Congress’s attention.” Congress paid attention
to gays solely in order to discriminate against them. The court
looked in the right place—Congress—but bungled the analysis.
Under the Dahl court’s approach, any time that gay people are
targeted by anti-gay laws, that law should be reviewed under
rational basis precisely because gays attracted the attention of
282
those wishing to do them harm.
CONCLUSION
The political power inquiry of equal protection analysis is
deeply flawed. It fails to take account of regional variations in
political power. Too often, judges cite isolated and irrelevant
280. Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 993.
281. 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
282. In another case challenging the military’s anti-gay policy, Steffan v.
Cheney, the court correctly looked for evidence of political power at the congressional level but incorrectly found it based on a largely irrelevant anecdote.
The court concluded that because thirty-three members of Congress had sent a
letter “urging the Secretary of Defense, a defendant in this case, to comply
with certain discovery requests. . . . [T]he homosexual community have been
able to move well and gain attention in political circles . . . [and, thus, the]
plaintiff has not been able to show that he is a member of a suspect class.”
Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1991), aff ’d sub nom. Steffan v.
Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The court never explained—because it
could not—how having approximately six percent of congressional legislators
sign a letter asking for mere cooperation with discovery requests translates
into political power over Congress to change the military’s anti-gay policy.
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anecdotes in order to make sweeping claims about the nationwide political power of gay Americans. As a result, the politically powerless gay residents of Oklahoma are denied heightened
scrutiny of anti-gay laws because legislators in California have
seen the wisdom of gay-inclusive nondiscrimination policies.
For courts determined to deny heightened scrutiny to gay
Americans, the political power inquiry provides an easily manipulated element. Ultimately, this Article provides additional
support for eliminating the political power component of the
suspect classification test altogether.

